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During the life time of Stalin the Arab bloc, and the 
underdeveloped areas in general, \vere praised or conderrmed 
by the standard of their acceptance of the Soviet point of 
vie-v,. There was no tolerance on the part of the Soviet 
' Union, for neutralism was considered to be no better than 
hostility. vlhen Stalin passed away this hard line was some-
what eased by hi~ successors who realized tr1at the \,Jestern 
aid policies were winning friends. The Soviet Union was 
ivorried by the creation of \Jestern defense pacts and the 
most likely response :was to woo the states avtay from the 
West. With the establishment of the Baghdad Pact the Soviets 
attempted to vitiate its power by isolating the 1·1iddle Eastern 
members from their Arab neighbors. To this end the Soviet 
Union sought to gain the support of Egypt and Syria wl1.o were 
displeased by the. fact that Iraq was being bolstered by 
aid sent to her as a Pact member. The Soviet trade and 
aid program began modestly enough but assumed large and 
strategic importance in 1955. In that year Egypt purchased 
a large supply of Czechoslovakian armaments, which action 
sent a chill down l~estern spines. Such a large amount of 
armament· in the hands of Nasser caused a sl1ift in the Middle 
Eastern equilibrium which the \.Jest had been trying to 
construct. 
The next year Egypt was again in the news when Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal Company. A£ter failing in an 
attempt to establish an international agency to control 
the operation of the Canal Britain and France invaded Egypt 
1'· 
'! 
V 
' ',
in the hope of f9rcing a concession from Nasser. But when 
the action was condenmed by the United States and world opi-
1 
nion the aggressors had to back down. This blunder gave 
the Soviet Union the opportunity of posing as a friend of 
the Arabs. The Soviets wereJcapitalizing on the economic 
needs of the Middle East as well as on. its: :political insta-
bility. 
Another crisis in 1957, this tirn.e over Syria, found 
the Soviet Union taking advantage of a turmoil aroused by 
Syria. It was widely believed that Syria \vas about to become 
a Soviet satellite, an opinion made credible by the fact 
that a great deai; of Communist armament ivas being shipped 
to that _eountry. Also, the Syrian Communi.st l->arty, under 
the leadership of Khaled Bakdash was quite a potent force 
/ 
in the country. Again, the ioviet Union profess~d support 
.of Syria against the aggressors who were prodding T'urkey to 
.attack. 
By a policy combin:at.ion of\\ political turmoil and eco-
nomic aid the Soviets were winning the praise of the Arab 
nationalists. But the Syrian Crisis gave the Arabs second 
thoughts. They did not want to become too· closely aligned 
with the Soviet bloc. Many i~portant elements in Syria 
feared Soviet domination and this was an important cause 
of the United Arab Republic. Thus, Soviet policy was 
successful in winning friends but not in removing the neu-
tral's fear of alignment with one bloc. 
\ ., .. 
_;., 
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I Stalin and the ·Middle East 
During World War II, the Soviet Union was wary of the 
various nationalistic movements which were becoming quite 
strong throughout the Middle East. Such drives as those 
toward Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism presented problems for the 
Soviet Union which had about thirty million Islamic peoples 
within its borders. With respect to the Pan-Islamic move-
ment, the Soviet Union maintained a passive hostility while 
Pan-Arabism received somewhat better treatment. For the 
particularly aggressive Arab, nationalist conmrunism was not 
especially :satisfying and was not able to hold such men as 
Michel Aflaq who ~ound the Communist movement wanting.1 
With the end of World War II the ~dddle East -appeared 
to be a fruitful ground for Soviet penetration, since France 
\ras relinquishing control over certain of her holdings and 
Britain was coming under increased Arab pressure to get out 
of the area. If we add to this the general instability 
within the Arab countries, we can see that here was a power 
vacuum made for exploitation.2 
As is kno~m from a study of history, Russia had tried 
to gain a footing in the ~liddle East for the last two hun-
dred years and this drive has now been strengthened by 
which would seek t_'? liberate the peoples 
of the area from exploitation. Also, the development of 
the cold war made it worth"tvhile for the Soviet Union·· to 
attempt to gain a position of power in the area so that its 
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economic and military potential could be denied to the 
Western powers. But instead of the time honored method 
·of establishing sovereignty over the area, we shall se*e 
that the method ndw'-to be employed by the Soviet Union is 
to establish itself a guarantor of the neutral's indepen-
dence and provider of technical and economic aid. 3 
But in attempting to win influence within the Middle 
East the Soviet Union was handicapped by the fact that the 
• • • regimes in that area were~very much anti-Communist and 
had banned the parties to which the Soviet Union could 
appeal in this situation.4 
During the period between 1947 and 1953 the Soviet 
Union had not as yet decided how to use Arab nationalism 
for the purpose of gaining a foothold in the V.d.ddle East. 
The Arab League was accused of being a British agency, a 
''reactionary bloc, 11 an "instrument in t_ll,e struggle against <_ J, 
the national liberation movement in the Middle East." After 
1950 the Soviets called for the liberation of the ~lid-Eastern 
peoples from colonial domination but there was no sympathy 
for the activities of Arab nationalist movements. Instead, 
the liberation was conside1·ed to be the task of Conununist 
or other sympathetic groups. 
Moscow approved of the left wing of the Egyptian Wafd 
Party but not of the remaining members. The Wafd was accused 
of being afraid of moving against the British and the monar-
chy. The l11loslem Brotherhood was condemned as being only 
outwardly anti-British while in reality it tried .to crush 
)' 
J 
:, 
C 
~ 
r 
t 
C 
C 
C 
I 
C 
t 
.J 
.I 
-3-
the "progressive forces''. in Egypt. The Arab League, which 
was accused of being a pro-British group,was by 1950 con-
denmed as having come under the influence of American im-
perialism.s· An example of the· Soviet opinion of the. Arab 
League is found in Red Star of April 29, 1950. Here the 
League was spoken of as 
••• an instrument for the enslavement of the peoples of the Arab East by the British imperialists. The British and .American imperialists are joi11tly e:,rploit-ing the League ts leaders~ who are obedient to them, for the realization of a further war and for the suppression of the Erogressive forces of the countries of the Middle Easto 
One important theoretical issue which was to have 
important consequences for Soviet policy l'7as the treatment 
of ''bourgeois nationalism." Unfortunately for the Soviets 
their initial reaction to this phenomenon was to deny their 
"progressive" role and to condemn them as agents of imperial-
ism.7 Stalin did not believe that anyone could be neutral 
between Communism and Capitalism and this meant the univer-
sal rule that the Soviet Union would support only those 
groups ~·1hich strove to liberate their countries from the 
yoke of imperialism under the Communist banner. Stalinist 
doctrine taught that "bourgeois parties" were incapable of 
eliminating imperialism and that only a Communist dominated 
moveme~t could accomplish, the task. · The Large Sovie·t En-- · 
cyclopedia observed that 
.. 
\~en the proletariat enters the fight as an indepen-dent political force, the upper strata of the national bourgeoisie betrays its people, and goes over to the camp of the imperialists •••• At present the proletariat is the hegemon in this fight • 
• 
() 
I 
·i 
i 
,, 
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This view was considered mandatory for all Comrnunists 
· and it was included in the doctrine . taught in Ru~sian 
schools. The rule controlled the Communist attitude toward 
all such rival groups and was used as an excuse for ex-
cluding all rival groups from the Communist fight to win 
power.a 
Yet, one could readily imagine that this attitude of 
the Soviet Union ,-1as bound to collide with the facts of 
life sooner or later. surely the Soviet Union had to come 
to realize that their interpretation of the situation in 
the newly independent, underdeveloped countries was false. 
And, indeed, this attitude did come under fire beginning 
in the late 1940 1 s. A particularly interesting account 
of this new interpretation and re-evaluation is given in 
the work by John Kautsky, Moscow and the Communist Party 
of India. In this work Ka.utsky examines the various stra-
tegies employed by the Corrununists in their drive for world 
domination. There is the right strategy, which regards 
... imperialism and feudalism as the main enemy and therefore, 
Communist strategy calls for a bourgeois democratic revo-
lution followed by a proletarian Socialist revolution. 
This strategy employs an alliance between those anti-feudal 
and anti-imperialist parties, both labor and bourgepisieo 
Th.is is what is called a ''united front from above" or a 
popular Front. 
Another strategy is that of the "Left. 11 This con-
siders Capitalism and the native bourgeoisie to be enemies, 
~ .. , 
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at least as important in rank as foreign imperialism 
and feudalism. This strategy envis,ages an early Social-
ist revolution merging wi tl1 or even skipping the bourgeois-
democra tic revolution. This strategy seeks to encompass 
the lvorkers, petty bourgeoisie, and the peasants, as well 
as interested individuals of any organization. It tries 
to gather as many people into the fold as possible who 
will follow the Communist line, and tvho will leave their 
former parties and denounce their form.er leaders as 
traitors. _ 
,1: ..... .,,. .. ,,,. .. 
These above strategies were used prior to World War 
II. However, during that war the Chinese Communists 
developed a third way which Kautsky chooses to call the 
Neo-:Maoist strategy. Like the Right strategy, it opposes 
imperialism and feudalism and expects two revolutions. 
Also, like the Right, it would like to have an alliance 
of workers, peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, and anti-
imperialist bourgeoisie. However, unlike the Right and 
more like the Left, it approaches these groups not from 
above through their principal parties but from below, • in 
opposition to rival parties. Thus we see that the Commu-
nist Party • claiming to be the true representative of 1S 
' all those ~vho are members of exploited classes. But, 
more than this, the Neo-Maoist strategy would also like 
to include certain capitalist classes not employed before. 
In short, .... fhis strategy developed by the Chinese, seeks 
to gather together all those who would be anti-imperialist, 
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l 
that is, against the enemies of the Chinese or Russian 
Comnn.1ni .. sts as the case may be. Anyone could be included 
' 
who would be for the Communist line and against American, 
British, and French interests. This strategy does not 
employ dogmatically a violent or a peaceful method; either 
could be used when necessary. The use of violence is a 
tactical tool and is not a strategic necessity. 
Moscow, too, began to re-evaluate its approach to the 
realities of the day. In 1947, when relations were strained 
with the United States, }bscow moved from a Right strategy 
to one of the Left. The Soviet Academy of Sciences came 
out with a particularly strong denunciation of Nehru and 
those like him who were accused of being imperialistic 
agents opposed to movements of the people. Before this time, 
the Soviets had been employing the Right strategy and so, 
such bourgeois representatives were included in the common 
cause in the battle against Nazism. But during this meet-
ing there also was noticeable a difference of opinion among 
several of the members. Academicians Dyakov and Balabushevich 
denounced the entire bourgeoisie and favored a movement to 
the Left strategy, a proletarian, anti-capitalist approach. 
On the other hand, Zhukov, the head of the Academy•s Pacific 
Institute, denounced only the big bourgeoisie, and thus was 
left open a path for a united front from below to include 
some sections of the bourgeoisie. This presentation of a 
middle way v1as the first time such a development had occurred 
in Moscow's strategy. 
• 
) 
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Iri a report to the first Cominform meeting in Sep-
tember 1947, Zdhanov introduced in his speech elements 
of what we have called the Neo-Maoist strategy. However, 
this strategy was not applied by him to the Asian situa-
tion. But this speech by 7Llhanov was interpreted in a 
Neo-Maoist manner by Zhukov in an article written as an 
analysis of the_colonial areas that had recently won 
independence. .. Hov1ever, Dyal<ov and Balabushevich at this 
time continued to expound the necessity of a Left strategy 
in the underdeveloped countries. And as of February 1948, 
the time of the South-East Asia Youth Conference, it was 
still not decided whether the Left or the Middle strategy 
was to be employed by the Asian Comrminist Parties. All 
that was mentioned wae-. that the Right strategy was no 
longer the style. 
Not until 1949 was a definite decision made between 
the Left and the Middle strategies. The adoption of a 
Neo-l1aoist, or Middle strategy, was signaled by a publi-
' 
cation in Pravda irr June 1949. At that time Liu Shao Chi 
asserted that all Asian Co1I111U1nist Parties must cooperate 
with sections of the bourgeoisie. Also in that year, in 
several articles written for the Soviet Academy of Science, 
not only Zhukov, but also Dyakov and Balabushevich, the 
former exponents of the Left strategy, came out in favor of 
the inclusion of bourgeois elements in a united front from~ 
below. 
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It is well for the Russian Communists that t~ey have 
adopted this middle path for, indeed, it does seem to fit 
the present-day situation in the underdeveloped countries. 
Using this method the Cormnunists can invite the cooperation 
of "~11 classes, parties, groups, organizations and indivi-
duals'1, including capitalists and those more feudalistic 
elements. All that these people need do is to show their 
friendliness for the Soviet Union and their antagonism 
toward t~e Western countries. Now the Communist Party can 
claim to represent not only the interests of the workers, 
but also the interests of certain Capitalists. Comnrunist 
propaganda emphasizes the interests held in common by all, \ 
\ 
\ both workers· and Capitalists, against those imperialists 
from the i'7est. In short, the Cold "t~ar now has replaced 
the class struggle. This, of course, is a perversion of 
classical Marxism, but it is a logical development out of 
Lenin's revolutionary doctrines. Marx had stressed the 
importance of the class intere·st and the necessity of divi-
sion among the various groups. Lenin, on the other hand, 
used to great effect, the principle that the workers must 
be lead by an elite group which alone knows the path of 
historical necessity. This Leninist conception divorced 
the Party from the workers by allowing this group to employ 
any means and any tools to further its ends. From this it 
follows that even the Capitalists can be used to further 
Comnru.nistic aims.9 
Yet in spite of this theoretical discussion, the 
., 
_., , 
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Middle East, as a rule, received little mention. Of course, 
there were a few books and articles written about the area, 
but the number signified a lack of interest in the Middle 
Ea.st. The reasons for this lack of interest are several: 
for one, there were no large parties in the l'lid-East, and 
the working-class and Communist groups were so small as not 
to warrant much attention. Books and articles were written 
on the condition of peasants in Syria and Lebanon, in Egypt, 
~ 
and Iraq, but nothing was said about trade unions or poli-
tical parties. Those in power in the Mid-East were believed 
to be hostile or, if friendly, potential traitors. A gener-
al world crisis was expected by the Soviet Union and ~.,hen 
it came the Mid-East would also be affected. In view of 
these conditions, the Soviets did not believe that there 
was much that could be done to gain more influence in the 
Middle East.10 
Since· the Soviet Union had no outstanding tactics to 
implement in the lill.ddle East around the, year 1950, the 
\ 
somewhat standard procedure of supporting Egypt•s drive for 
the ousting of Britain ·and the non-cooperation of the Arabs I 
with the West was employed. Yet the Soviets were not happy 
about the fact that Egypt failed to condemn the United 
States along with Britain. As long as Egypt remained neu-
tral petween America and the Soviet Union, Voscow saw no 
chance of a rapprochement with Cairo.11 
'41.so, while Stalin lived, there was little done to 
develop economic relations with non-bloc countries. One 
' ,, .. ,. ,, .. , , ... 
\ 
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hindrance to the expansion of trade was the fact that Russia 
had not yet achieved an economic growth sufficient to allow 
the exportation of finished goods on.a large scale. Still 
another reason for the lack of trade with the Arab countries 
was that before the Second World War these states obtained 
only 5% of their total imports from the Soviet Union. 
During the War the amount of trade dropped even further, so 
that the Soviet Union lost interest in the possibilities of 
trade with the Arab bloc.12 
One important drive sponsored by the Soviet Union in 
the Middle East was a propaganda campaign to foster some 
hatred for the American imperialists. As far as the non-
Conmiunist nationalists in the area were concerned, Britain 
and France were the colonial exploiters, whereas it was the 
United States which had helped to solve the problems hinder-
ing their withdrawal. Soviet propaganda tried to counter-
act this favorable impression by exP-osing the "real" 
-~ 
\ intentions of the Americans, namely, tci, replace the British 
I 
and Fr~nch as cqlonial exploiters. The Arab states were 
told that their enemy was not Britain and France so much as 
the Americans, who pretended to be the friend of the Arabs. 
The-· Soviet Union warned that any country friendly to America 
could not count on any Sov~et support.13 
If the Soviet Un-ion had little interest in the Middle ' -
East before 1950 it tm..1st have taken notice of Western acti-
vities which began in that year. In a Declaration of May 25, 
1950, the 'tJe.stern rowers made an offer to sell the Middle 
--11-
Eastern states arms to be used for defense and internal 
~ 
security~ But the offer was received with little interest 
because the Arabs were more interested in finding arms for 
use against Israel, and did not want weapons if they could 
not be used for aggressive purposes. Also, there l;vas some 
friction over the stalemate in the Anglo-Egyptian talks on 
the British military base in Suez.14 
Britain came to realize that the Arab states were not 
interested in having a situation in ,-1hich Britain would 
maintain a system of bases throughout the Middle East for 
-
the protection of her interests. Therefore, along with 
the United States, the British tried to produce another 
alternative which took the form of multilateral defense 
agreements. This meant that the Western bloc would assume 
responsibility for the defense of the whole area, with the 
• 
old system of imperial relationships consigned to the grave. 
The British hoped that such an arrangement would counteract 
the nationalist drive sponsored by the Wafd in the fall of 
1951. But the proposal came too late to stop the abrogation 
of the 1936 treaty by King Faruq. Even so, the Egyptians 
were wary of the Western offer attached to which was the 
possibility that Egypt could be reoccupied. The 'tvestern 
offer of November 1951 for regional defense was turned down 
as most unacceptable. 
This strong position taken by Egypt induced the United 
States and Britain to attempt the establishment of a de-
fense pact in partnership with those Arab states such as 
/' 
.l> 
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Iraq, who were .friendly to the West. These moves were 
,. 
the beginning of what was soon to be the Baghdad Pact • 
..:--1 
Even with the Egyptian revolution in 1952, and the 
coming to power of General Naguib, the situation with 
respect to British interests remained the same. Al-
though the new regime proclaimed its intention to con-
centrate on domestic problems, its extreme nationalism 
in foreign affairs was evident. General Naguib did bend 
a little when he granted the Sudan's right to self-
determination and independence, but this ,vas his only 
act of moderation. On the matter of the British bases 
in the canal zone, the withdrawal of British troops, and 
new defense agreements, General Naguib was adamant. 
General Naguib appeared to follow the line that if any 
concessions were to be made, the British would have to 
make them.15 
The Soviet Union was not at all impressed with the 
,I') 
new revolutionary government in Egypt. An example of 
Communist thought on the matter is found in a Polish 
Press J\gency report of August 20, 1952, which spoke of 
the coue as ttaimed at establishing a fascist military 
dictatorship to stifle the growing anti-imperialist move-
ment in Egypt. General Naguib's bloody reprisals against 
the working class show his fear of the growing power of 
the Egyptian masses'' .16 ~ 
But if the Soviet Union had no use for Egypt's new 
government, the feeling was reciprocated by Colonel Nasser 
.. 
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:• 
who approved of defensive efforts taken as-~a precaution 
against Soviet aggression. Nasser dubbed the Soviet Union 
as an aggressor and asked, nThe object of the aggressor? 
To reach the oil fields of Abadan, Mosul, the Dharan, and 
to reach Egypt on account of her strategic Position which 
is of capital importance for Africa and tl1e 1~1editerranean''• 
The Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council observed that 
There seems no doubt that Egypt today holds in all respects to the side of the l~est. Her culture, her commerce, and her economic life are bound to the Westo Ideologically she is definitely opposed to Communism. 1.-:lilitarily she consider~ that the only danger capable of threatening the Middle East is a Soviet invasion ••• 11 
As far as Nasser was concerned, Britain should have the 
right to enter the bases in the canal in the event of 
war.17 
But as a rule, the Soviet Union was not much concerned 
about the new Egyptian government. The Soviet Middle 
I Eastern experts condemned the junta as fascists, but offi-
cial Soviet policy was more reserved and took a pasition of 
watchful waiting. If the Egyptians attacked the West for 
some reason or another, the Soviets assumed a more cordial 
posture, whereas Egyptian cooperation with the "imperialists" 
was readily condemned.la 
Before the Egyptian revolution in 1952 the country 
was primarily agrarian in nature and which enterprise 
accounted for 90% of the Gross National Proauct. Basically, 
Egypt had a free-enterprise economy although the state did 
supervise such things as irrigation and railtr,ays. Taxes 
) 
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· ·t-1ere low with the government using only a little over 
20% of the national income. Income was very unequal and 
foreigners were very important in the econ9my, and in some 
" sectors, dominant. A.lso, the military played a minor part 
in the society which ··was run by civilians and in which 
there was much intellectual and political freedom.19 
After the revolution the new rulers tried to put some 
..• 
discipline and life into the civil administration and 
sponsored legislation limiting agricultural estates to 
200 acres, along lvi th a distribution of land to peas an ts. 
But this was only a small endeavor since there was not 
enough suitable land to distribute to the fast growing pop-
ulation. Industrialization was necessary to relieve the 
ills which Egypt was experiencing.20 
To better develop the country, Egypt was to embark upon 
a program which was to become quite familiar in the under-
developed countries. This was the adoption of an approach 
whose philosophy was a combination of nationalism, militarism, 
and socialism. The basis of this creed was resentment of 
Western economic and political domination along with a 
resolve to, assert national sovereignty. Socialism was 
adopted in the belief that more social equality would result. 
Capitalism, with its emphasis on individual gain, was con-
sidered to be immoral since it could only be had at the ex-
pense of the public interest. It was also believed that 
social planning would be the panacea which ,.,ould bring 
economic development, social we~fare, and national power.· 
• J 
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There was also the conviction that since the objective was 
to.be neutral in foreignvPolicy, then an economic policy 
rrru.st be 11either capitalist after the t~estern model, nor 
Socialist after the Soviet pattern, since to adopt either 
arrangement wholeheartedly would necessitate alignment 
with one or the other bloc. But Egypt foun4. herself 
copying the Soviet pattern, seeing only the accomplishments 
and none~ of the costs in the human condition. Also used 
as models for Egypt's development were Yugoslavia and 
Indian and Western socialism. It does not appear as though 
those ,vho found themselves in positions of power in 1952 
had a pre-arranged program with which to carry out the 
development of Egypt. Rather, it would seem as though 
between 1952 and 1956, when civilian influence was still 
great, that the new leaders moved cautiously along ortho-
dox lines so as not to disn.ipt the Egyptian situation.21 
In 1953 the United States had a new president and 
came to realize that those countries on the southern 
' border of the Soviet Union were not following political 
principles which would militate against their accepting 
American economic and military aid.22 
In that same year, Secretary of State Dulles made a 
tour of the Vdddle East and said that he had found a 
t•vague desire" among those countries close to the Soviet 
. - • - .. -~ ~~. L'• 
Union for some sort of collective security system. Dulles 
also asserted: ''While awaiting the creation of a formal 
Security AssQciation, the United States, I am sure, can 
( 
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II I •' 
usefully help strengthen the interrelated defenses of 
these countries if they want strength, not against each 
other or against the \,Jest, but to resist the common threat 
to all free peoples". 
' The first reaction to this American offer came from 
'fu.rkey and Pakistan, who announced in February 1954 that 
they would hold talks on collective defense. A few days 
later, the United States declared that it would give to 
Pakistan both economic and military aid. At the same 
time, Pakistan assured Egypt, which was experiencing 
difficulty between Nasser and Naguib, that she would con-
tinue to support the Arab cause against Israel, and 
Egypt's demands for Britain to withdraw from Suez bases.23 
")' 
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II Policy Change After Stalin 
As we have seen, Stalin followed a rigid policy 
toward those countries which tried to remain neutral 
between East and West. However, a short time before his 
death in 1953, Stalin did appear to have a change in atti-
tude, no doubt brought on.by the realization that if the 
United States was trying to woo these countries, then the 
Soviet Union had better not be left out in the cold by· ,.J 
following a PQlicy which would give the Americans a free 
hand among the neutrals. The Russians might have felt 
that their chances were good when Communists like Khaled 
Bakdash were running in~arliamentary elections. Commu-
nist propaganda now began to speak of the necessity for 
"broad, popular fronts uniting all national forces". In 
a speech made before the Supreme Soviet on August a, 1953 
Ma.lenkov seemed to mark a change of policy when he made 
some favorable rem.arks about Middle Eastern governments.l 
But this change in attitude on the part of the Soviet 
leaders did not mean that they were ready to entertain 
proposals such as that made by an Egyptian delegation 
which was touring Europe looking for economic aid and mili-
tary supplies. The _·Egyptian request was given little con-
sideration by the Soviet Union no doubt because the Soviets 
were not yet certain just how far they wanted to go in 
order to gain influence among the neutrals. 2 
In spite of this rejection of the Egyptian proposal 
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it should be noted that about this time, the possibility 
of a Soviet economic offensive became a real option in view ' 
of the fact the Soviet economy was rapidly recovering from 
the effects of the war. The 10% annual increase in produc-
tion meant·that the Soviet economy could support a measure 
of economic competition ,vith the West in the underdeveloped 
countries. 
During the year 1954, the Soviet Union appeared to 
realize that the foreign aid programs of the United States 
were helping to maintain Western economic-_strength among the 
-underdeveloped countries even though these same states were 
demanding the withdrawal of Western physical presence. From 
these facts, the Russians were bound to draw the necessary 
conclusions.3 
The period following the death of Stalin was a momentous 
one for the leadership of the Soviet Union. Not only were 
there problems of succession, but also world affairs were 
sho,ving most explicitly the folly of following a dogmatic 
approach to international politics. We hav.e mentioned the 
fact that with the ending of British and French colonial 
domination in the Middle East, there was a power vacuum to 
be filled and the Soviet Union, for her Olm security, had 
to make the attempt at filling the void. This particular 
problem did not occur with respect to all the underdeveloped 
countries. Stalin, and his successors, were suspicious of 
those who considered themselves neutral between East and 
West, but they were not too much concerned with those 
--------~~-----------........................ ~:_.. ... , .. , ................ ,, 
,,;JI, 
-19-
b 
neutral states lying some distance from the borders of 
the Soviet Union. But the states of the ~liddle East were 
an entirely different matter. Since the Arab states could 
serve as military bases for a potential aggressor, the 
Soviet Union had to remove Britain from the area by dip-
- -
lomatic process and prevent the entry of any third power J 
which could threaten Soviet security -- most notably, the 
United States. For this end there were propaganda and 
political campaigns (e.g. the advocacy of the partition 
of Palestine) designed to weaken the position of Britain 
and ~o get her out of the Middle East. As was said, this 
was a most critical period for Soviet diplomacy because 
Soviet power had to 'succeed that of Britain's before- the 
United States, "1itl1 her superior economic potential, cou]_d 
fill the void. Since the United States already had superior 
economic potential for aid programs and represented a mili-
tary threat, Soviet diplomacy would have to be of superior 
quality. But at the same time, the old Stalinist opinions 
of bourgeois groups .. _ which we have seen - no longer 
could be followed, since they did not fit reality, and the 
luxury of ti1ne, in which one could gradually form loyal 
party men into a new mold with which to view the situation, 
could no longer be afforded. 
Thus, as the power of Khrushchev began to gro~v within 
the Soviet Union there follo,Yed a change in attitude tolvard 
the ''national bourgeoisie''. 4 This new policy, which at 
times was f ollo,ved even though it adversely affected the 
... 
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Comnrunist parties in the Middle East, we shall now examine. 
In looking at the countries of the Middle East, the 
Soviet Union did not see a ready and likely prospect which 
could be convinced of the benefits in a Soviet connection. 
However, the Soviets were somewhat partial to Syria because 
of the strength of the Communist Party in that country.5 
Of all the Communist parties in the Arab states, that of 
• 
'· Syria had become the most unified under the'}-leadership of 
,~ 
Khaled Bakdash. The ''Partisans of Peace", a fellow- \-\, 
traveling movement during the early 1950's, had helped to 
create a favorable atmosphere for.Communism among some 
important members of the bourgeoisie of Damascus. Also, 
the Syrian Communist Party had been successful in gaining 
a measure of influence in the army.6 Of course, for the 
various governments of Syria, the Soviet Union had little 
use. A democratic regime in the late 1940's was accused 
of persecuting Communists; the military dictatorship of 
Husni Zaim, who came to power in 1949, was said to be a 
stooge of the American and French imperialists, an enemy 
of progressive forces, and attempting the ''fascistization 
of the country". Zaim was overthrown bv Sarni Hinnawi who 
... 
in turn was called a British agent by Moscow, but on the 
whole he was the victim of fewer epithets than his prede-
-., 
cessor. The next to rule Syr~··w~s Adib Shishakli, but 
the Soviet Union maintained a passive attitude to~vard his 
• regime. 
The non-Conrruunist parties of Syria had been considered 
' 
(. ,' 
·-
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as enemies of the Conununists; however, during Shishakli's 
administration there lvas a trend toward a ''national front'' 
policy. Those Syrian parties, which the Soviet Union now 
favored, were the National Party headed by Sabri al Assali 
which represented the "national bourgeoisie and the land-
o'Wllers", and the Socialist Re2ublican Ba' ath Party which 
represented "the national bourgeoisie, the small entrepre-
neurs, some sections of artisans, and also having v1orkers 
and peasants among its members''. The Soviet Union spoke 
favorably of these parties as representing the trend toward 
Syrian independence and opposing Western imperialism. How-
ever, the party which was the largest up until the year 1955, 
the People's Party, was accused of being the representative 
of the monopolists and upper strata of the national bour-
geoisie.7 
Shishakli was ousted in February 1954 ,at which time a 
democratic administration came into power. The Communists 
again had more freedom to maneuver and were soon to estab-
lish one of the strongest organizations in the country. 
With the coming of the new government, Soviet influence 
began to grow within Syria and this new prestige was not 
solely caused by the Syrian CoIImlunists. 
The Soviet Union had been indifferent toward the 
Shishakli government and when he was overthrown, the Soviets 
did not conunent on the event. It was not until much later 
that Shishakli was characterized in the Soviet press as a •• ,I'•',, 
' 'Western agent''. The attitude which the Russians took with 
' ! 
:l 
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respect to Shishakli whilehe was still in power is re-
flected by the fact that Mr. Vyshinski voted in favor of 
.' 
Syria in the Security Council meeting in January of 1954, 
when that Arab state was engaged with Israel in a dispute 
over the Jordan River.a 
Upon the removal of Shishakli, the Soviet Union 
assumed a cautious attitude, not knowing what to expect 
from the new Syrian government. The new administration, 
under the leadership '·-of Farizal Khouri, was thought to be 
lax in attac~ing imperialism.9 But in spite of this hesi-
tancy on the part of the Russians, more support was forth-
coming for Syria. Relations of a commercial and cultural 
nature were developed: a delegation of Syrian students 
paid a visit~ to the Soviet Union, and a Soviet film festi-
val took place in Damascus. The new posture of the Soviets 
was revealed by the position taken by that country when 
Syria banned the film The Fall of Berlin. The Soviet Union 
accused West Germany and the United States of applying 
pressure upon Syria to ban the film. Also around this time 
Moscow more and more warned Syria of the threat which Turkey 
was becoming. The Soviet press warned the Syrian people 
that Turkey coveted Aleppo and other parts of Northern 
Syria. Given the nature of the Syrian mood and situation, 
these warnings were not without effect.10 
At about the same t1me that Moscow was considering the 
possibility of winning Syria over to the Soviet cause, the 
i [ 
I 
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r decision had been made that it was well ,;vorth making an, 
attempt at wooing Egypt. The nationalistic excitement 
within Egypt was proper ground for a cultural penetration 
by the Soviets. One example of Soviet writings showing the 
new approach is an article entitled "In Egypt" which 
appeared in Pravda on August 15, 1954. Here was given a 
Marxist analysis of classical Egypt. It was said that 
Egypt had 110w begun to take notice of her ''polite Russian 
friends". The article asked why it 'tvas that in a land of 
such rich natural resources there should be such p~rty 
~, 
. 
while a few wealthy businessmen lived so handsomely. _;>1e 
bourgeoisie were said to represent foreign· money which 
had brought the outrageous ''.American way of life••, which 
was symbolized by gangster movies, comic strips, and Coca 
Cola.11 
This new Soviet enthusiasm for the Egyptian cause was 
accompanied by increased contacts on the part of the Soviet 
-
Ambassador to Egypt, }fr. Daniel Solod, with the foreign 
ministry of that Arab state. Ambassador Solod assured 
Egypt that the Arab cause would receive the complete sup-
port of the Soviet Union. The Russians demonstrated this 
suppor·t by vetoing the. proposal of New Zeal-and in the 
Security Council calling for freedom of navigation through 
the Suez Canal. This proposal had been a move against the 
Egyptian prohibition of Israeli shipping in the Canal. 
Previously, a similar proposal had only met \vith a Soviet 
abstention. 
l. 
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This Soviet move had come after the late 1953 con-
flict between Egypt and Britain which resulted in many 
incidents along the Suez Canal. When relations grew 
friendlier between Egypt and the Soviet Union, a trade 
delegation head~d by the Egyptian Deputy Minister of War 
paid a visit to Y~scow, and in 1'1arch of 1954 a trade 
agreement 'tvas signed in Cairo. Hassan Ra.ghib remarked 
that Moscow had been very impressive and the Egyptian 
. ' Minister in Moscow, Azizal Masri, praised the Soviet po-
sition "in favor of the peoples fighting for national 
independence".12 
Also in March 1954, the Soviet Union raised to 
embassy rank its legation in Cairo. But at the same time 
' 
. 
similar action was taken in Tel-Aviv.13 No doubt the 
Russians were not yet ready to put all their eggs in one 
baslcet. 
During the Spring of 1954 certain events occurred which 
made it imperative for the Soviet Union to bolster its po-
sition in the Middle East. On April 2, a defense pact was 
signed between Turkey and Pakistan which carried an invita-
tion to other countries in the neighborhood to join. At 
the same time, Nuri es-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, 
asserted that his country would purchase Western arms in 
conformity with the proposals made in 1950. And the next 
month, on lvia.y 19, the United States signed a defense treaty 
with Pakistan. Britain was not too sure whether or not 
,, 
', 
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these defense arrangemeBts were the smart thing to do. The 
British. v1ere hesitant in assuming obligations in an area in 
which there was no certainty that she would have a land base 
from which to launch a counterattack in case of conflict. 
The reaction in }~scow was to send protests to Pakistan 
and Turkey, while Egypt warned the United States that she 
would do her best to limit such a pact.14 
The Egyptian press launched a campaign against Iraq for 
her disposition to accept .American aid. This ·attack was 
probably caused by Egypt's anger over the fact that an Arab 
state was withdrawing from a neutral position. By following 
a neutral policy, Egypt had hoped to pressure the United 
States into forcing Britain to leave the Suez cana1.lS Still 
another cause for Egypt•s wrath was the possibility that Iraq 
might be strengthened to such an extent by Western aid that 
Iraq, and not Egypt, would become the dominant ~ab power. 
The feeling of Egypt was reflected in a statement by 
the Commander in Chief of the Egyptian army, Abdel Hakim Amer, 
printed in Izvestia. He said that the real threat to the 
Middle East was Western domination, and not Soviet pene-
tration. The Soviet Union, in turn, reciprocated the compli-
./ 
ment by refraining from criticism of Egyptian domestic 
developments •. In :May of 1954 General Naguib clashed with 
Colonel Nasser, but the Soviet Union did not bother to 
comment on this development, nor on the fact that the 
Egyptian press was vigorously denouncing Communism.16 
The summer of 1954 was a time of uncertainty with 
I 
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respect to Soviet Egyptian relations. Events occurred 
which made one wonder just what the relationship between 
the two states was. By this time a military alignment 
based on Western power ·had begun to appear. 'I\trkey, a 
NATO member, had a defense agreement with Pakistan which 
had a defensive pact with the United States, and Iraq was 
expressing willingness to accept Western arms. In August 
1954 Iraq proposed an extensive defense pact and discussed 
~ 
with Egyptian delegates, the poss~.bility of Egypt's in-
clusion. But Egypt strongly opposed such an idea because 
of her rivalry with Iraq.17 
This situation put Egypt into a difficult position. 
If other Arab states followed the Iraqi example, Egypt 
could find herself isolated and without influence. For 
Egypt the problem was this: to build up her power so that 
she could be the dominant power 'tvhile at the same time, 
maintaining a neutral posture. If Nasser held to his 
opinion of the Soviet Union, which we have quoted above, a 
shift into the Soviet camp would be repulsive for him. On 
the other hand, if Egypt turned West, she would set an ex-
ample for the other Arab states which would then tend to 
follow the Egypt-Iraqi example. But, if the Arab bloc 
moved into the 1{.~estern camp, not only would they fear neo-
colonialism, but most important, as far as Egypt was con-
cerned, there would be no special position for her from 
which she could rise to become the dominant Arab power. 
In order to maintain a neutral posture Egypt began, 
.< 
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in the sunnner of 1954, to import Soviet wheat and fuel 
while, at the same time, she increased her trade with East-
ern Europe.18 Also, in September, a Soviet cultural center 
was opened in Cairo and an Egyptian tourist agency was dis-
cussing the opening of an office in lioscow.19 
But in the latter part of 1954 Egypt signed an agree-
ment with Britain on the future of the Suez Canal. Britain 
declared that the treaty of 1936 was terminated \Egypt had 
already denounced it in October of 1951) and the new agree-
ment called for British evacuation of the Canal Zone bases 
. . ' 
within twenty months. However, if there occurred an act of 
aggression against a country which was a member of the Arab 
League or on Turkey, then Britain would be allowed to base 
her troops in the Canal Zone. In the event of "a threat of 
an armed attack", Egypt and Britain would immediately hold 
consultations. This agreement was not considered to be an 
alliance, and the termination of the 1936 treaty meant that 
Britain would no longer have an instrument to maintain her 
own interests in the area in the same manner as in times 
past. This was a victory for Egypt.20 
Russia, however, saw this as a gain for American diplo-
macy, a movement by Egypt toward the West. No doubt, it 
did show that Egypt was not ready to lean too far to one 
side, but the Soviets did not seem to accept this position. 
Perhaps they thought that a neutral would only maintain such 
a posture until won over by trade and aid. It "tvould appear 
as though the Soviets were not yet ready to accept neutralism 
(._ -· 
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on its ovm terms.· This Soviet attitude is revealed by 
the Soviet reaction to the Egypt-Britain agreement of 
October. 
The Soviet press was the first to att-ack Egypt for 
what it considered to be her folly at joining the l\merican 
camp. Officially, the Soviet Union did not curse the 
Egyptians and appeared to sympathize with her foolish act, 
the result of American intrigue which had dupped Egypt•s 
rulers. But one Soviet propaganda age11cy, the "Voice of 
National Independence and Peace", tvhich was an Arab language 
radio station in Budapest, called the leader of Egypt 
treasonous and deserving to be overthrown by the people. 
However, as time passed, even official Soviet opinion 
became more critical of the agreement which was "the first 
step toward the incli1sion of Egypt in the Western bloc't. 
Now Soviet propaganda gave its opinion on Egyptian domestic 
affairs to the extent that the ~~slem Brotherhood was backed 
in its conflict with the regime, Colonel Nasser damned and 
General Naguib supported, the \nJafd praised, and the junta 
' castigated. The news agency TASS, took Egypt to task for 
her persecution of the Communists and the "Partisans of 
Peace". ''The \vhole nation dissociates itself from a govern-
ment that has been utterly dishonored' 1.21 
And when Nasser assumed power for himself, the Soviet 
Union almost burst a blood vessel. Moscow lamented the fate 
of the true democrats who had fallen under the hand of vio-
lent reactionaries. ,The cruelty of the regime 'tvas said to 
-29- ' . 
reveal the extreme measures to which it had to resort 
because of fear of the people. Egypt was warned that the 
agreement she signed ,;~1i th Britain was against the best 
interests of herself and all Arab states. The workers 
of Egypt were said to face a long fight before they would 
have a democratic government. The economic and social re-
forms, such as the agrarian reform, were said to be devices 
to save the large landowners from a revolution which must, 
nevertheless, come. 
f,, ' ' ' 
By the latter part of 1954, Egypt's new government 
had received more adverse Soviet criticism than had the 
Wafd administration in the two years before the revolu-
tion.22 Thus, what began as a new and favorable attitude 
toward the Egyptian government, appeared to degenerate into 
a more hostile one. 
But this Soviet criticism did not seem to influence 
Egypt's domestic course of action. During the winter of 
1954, the l-1oslem Brotherhood was eliminated and many Conunu-
nists had been thrown in prison with lengthy sentences. 
However, the Soviet Union did not go so far in its condem-
nation of Egypt as to wash its hands of her; Egypt had not 
yet become a Western ally. The friction between Egypt and 
Turkey (plus other Western states) gave the Soviet Union 
renewed hope, and gradually the Soviets eased their criti-
cism.23 During the Cairo Conference of Arab prime ministers 
Egypt denounced the West in general, but Turkey and Iraq 
in particular. \.fuen Nasser accepted an invitation to 
, 
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attend the conference at Bandung, he signified his posi-
tion as being definitely neutralist. 24 
Although the Soviet Union was heatedly attacking the 
Egyptian goverrunent in the latter half of 1954, such was 
not the case with respect to Syria. Soviet-Syrian rela-
tions became friendlier as was shown by the cultural ex-
changes and visits to the Soviet Union by Syrian students, 
agricultural experts, and physicians. Syrian scientists 
visited Russia in November and December and were given a 
gracious reception which was well reported in the Syrian 
press. }1oslem groups, upon returning from tours of the 
Soviet Union, reported that Moslems there had ''absolute 
freedom" and suggested that Syria could profit by Soviet 
experiences. 25 
But the real turning point in Soviet-Syrian relations 
was the election in September when the strength of the 
radicals increased. The Cormnunist Party whose leader, 
Khaled Bakdash, was elected to Parliament, emerged as 
Syria's strongest party.26 This result was greatly pleas-
ing to the Soviet Union which continued all the while to 
warn the Syrians of Western intrigue and Turkish designs 
upon Syria • 
.. 
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III 1955 Arms for Egypt 
By 1955, a new Soviet line of policy with respect to 
the underdeveloped countries was in evidence. The new 
program had three aspects: an at·tempt to demonstrate the 
friendliness of the Soviet Union for the .Arab states while 
maintaining an attitu¥ of aloofness toward Israel; the 
desire of the Soviet Union to be recognized as a great power 
having a stake in any political settlements occurring in 
the Mid-East; the enhancement of Soviet influence in the 
"' 
area through her trading and aid policies.1 
This program was not the result of conclusions drawn 
from Marxist-Leninist theory by the Soviet experts. While 
Soviet politicians were changing their methods, the experts 
on dogma continued their classic denunciations of Arab 
nationalism. But as it was, the experts still did not have 
cause to concoct fundamental and creative interpretations 
of Marx and Lenin, since the new Soviet policy did not 
apply to the whole area. Soviet policy toward Iran and 
Turkey remained the same while relations with Israel con-
tinued to decline. The Arabs ,,1ere the great progressive 
people and even Marx had believed that some peo2,les were 
more advanced than others (dogmatically considered).2 
From the viewpoint of strategy and security, there 
were two reasons for this Soviet policy toward the Arab 
\ 
states. The first was the desire to develop friendships 
with those countries which have adversaries in common with 
I . 
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the Soviet Union so that, if possible, the enemy could be 
surrounded. On the borders of the Soviet Union were Turkey 
and Iran, with Iraq not too distant. This meant that the 
largest Arab ·power should be cultivated as a potential 
friend and, in this case, the most likely prospect was 
Egypt. 
The second reason for the new Soviet policy was to 
attempt the establishment of governments which would have 
ideological sympathy for Russia. This would mean the for-
mation of Communist governments with Syria and Iraq being 
likely candidates for this possibility.3 The strength of 
the Communists in these latter two countries gave rise to 
such a hope, but this is not to say that the goverrunents 
of these countries were anxious to be in the Soviet camp. 
In fact, the Soviet Union had begun to choose sides, and 
it was now supporting Egypt in its quarrels with Iraq. 
But at the start of 1955 the Soviets were not at all 
pleased with events occurring in Egypt. There were purges, 
Q 
arrests, and mass trials which were primarily directed 
t 
against the Moslem Brotherhood, but which also snared some 
Communists. The Soviets were hesitant in commenting on 
these happenings, but they were not happy about them. 
However, trade relations continued to be normal, and some 
new agreements were signed with Hungary and Poland, and in 
Iv.larch an industrial exhibition was held in Cairo under the 
sponsorship of Czechoslovakia.4 
In January of 1955 Egypt had had disastrous flooding 
• 
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I. 
resulting from heavy rains. The Soviets were quick to 
respond, and .Ambassador Solod ''expressed the Soviet govern-
ment 1 s sympathy f·o the Egyptian people He also in-
formed [the Egyptian Foreign Minister] that the u.s.s.R. 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has decided to send 
60 ,ooo rubles •••• to aid flood victims in Egypt" .s 
Also in January, the Soviet propaganda organs were 
busy trying to convince Syria that the imperialists were 
at the door and she had better beware • .Pravda observed: 
The inspirers of international provocations want 
to accomplish the same thing in Syria that they 
accomplished in Guatemala last yearo Informa-
tion has reached the press that the American plotters intend to use ·their usual tactics in 
Syria also o First~ to provoke some sort of "strike'' by armed bandits whom they have previously supplied 
with weapons through Iraq and Turkey, and in this 
way, to stir up disordero Then the armed bandits 
are to proclaim the governruent "incapablei' of 
coping ~vith the situation in the country. Then follow the arrests of undesirable persons, etc ••• 6 
By the month of March the Russians were warning Syria 
/,, that recent developments in that country were most unsatis-
factory to Washington, London, and Anl<.ara. ttQpen hatred 
is expressed toward the new Syrian government which has 
proclaimed the rejection of the military pacts and military 
aid of the imperialist powers". Turkey was accused of 
concentrating two divisions on the border in order to 
pressure the Syrian government and the Deputies in the par-
liament who supported el-Assali's government.7 ) 
As the month wore on, the Soviet press said the Turkish 
threat was increasing as the result of American efforts to 
•. ~ 
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force Arab countries, particularly Syria, into a mili-
tary pact.a 
While the l~est was being denounced for its ''pressure!'. 
to force Syria into a military· pact, an event occurred 
.. which was to have no small effect upon Egypt's future 
policy. This was the savage and strong Israeli raid into 
Gaza. Egypt was too weak militarily to reply in kind, 
and this deficiency meant that arms must be had. Nasser 
did launch "commandon raids into Israel, but such activi-
ties were merely a cover for the fact that Egypt was too 
impotent to take more effective action.9 
That same spring saw the formation of the Baghdad 
Pact, a factor which presented a serious problem to both 
the Soviet Union and Egypt. \~e have seen that Egypt, 
entertaining grandiose ideas about leading_an Arab nation, 
was not happy with Iraq's willingness to accept Dulles' 
offer of military aid for defensive purposes. If Iraq 
was strengthened by the '\'1est, Egypt would have to compete 
with another Arab power for influence in the Mid-East. 
The Prime Minister of Iraq had tried to interest 
Egypt in some type of defensive arrangement between the 
two, but Nasser vetoed the idea for the above reasons. 
This made Iraq join the 'Iurkey-Pakistan Pact on February 24 
' . 
. 
and on April 5, Britain came into the treaty. 1be whole 
defensive grouping became known as the Baghdad Pact while 
in the Pact's namesake was established a Secretariat to 
coordinate activities.10 
\ 
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The reaction of Egypt was to launch a violent cam-
paign of denunciation and vituperation against !raq, 
'lurkey, and the entire West while the response of the 
Soviet Union was somewhat more\ restrained and in the ' 
. 
traditional manner of shock at imperialist exploitation.11 
The Pact, composed of the already mentioned countries, was 
soon joined by Iran, which made it an alliance of four 
-
underdeveloped countries with Turkey and Iran, bordering 
Russia's southern flank, being the heart of the arrange-
ment. This meant that this important area was in tha 
Western camp and could serve as a base in time of war 
against Russia.12 The West could argue that these states 
were not strong enough to attack the Soviet Union, but 
as the latter saw things, the 0 imperialists" now had the 
legal right to establish offensive bases supplied with 
nuclear weapons which could inflict heavy damage upon 
Russia in short notice. Also, with a major power pledged 
to defend the countries along the Soviet's southern flank, 
her freedom of action in dealing wi-th the }li.ddle East was 
restricted.13 
I The official response of the Soviet {Jhion to the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact came in a statement pub-
lished in Pravda on April 17, 1955. The }1inistry of 
Foreign Affairs accused the \.Jest of "creating military 
groupings in the l~ear and l"n.ddle East like [those] in 
Southeast Asia (the so-called SEATO), [which] springs 
from the desire ••.• to bring these countries under 
'·' 
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colonial enslavement." The Soviets asserted that the 
real purpose of these military pacts was to give the 
imperialists an opportunity to exploit the countries in 
·~he area. Al though the Soviet . Union seemed to be ex-
pressing their pity for the Vdddle Eastern countries 
because of their ''enslavement'', the statement went on to 
warn: 
.J 
It goes without saying that the Soviet Union cannot 
be indifferent to the situation taking shape in the 
Near and lviiddle l~ast, since the formation of blocs 
and the creation of foreign military bases in Near 
and Middle Eastern countries have a direct bearing 
on the security of the u~s.s.R. The Soviet Govern-
mentis position should be all the more understandable 
because the UoS.S.Ro is situated in close proximity 
to these countries which cannot be said of other 
foreign powers, such as the U.S.A., which is thousands 
of kilometers away from this area. 
Nonparticipation by Near artd 1'··1iddle Eastern countries 
in aggressive military blocs would be an important 
prerequisite for ensuring their security and the best 
guarantee against their involvement in dangerous 
military v,entures. 
The Soviet Government also made a proposal to the 
\ 
countries of the Middle East which gave a hint of Soviet 
policy to come. The Soviets declared their willingness to 
take a positive attitude toward these countries so as to 
strengthen their national independence and to promote 
friendly cooperation. 
The Baghdad Pact had been designed to strengthen the 
·so-called Northern Tier, but if it had been hoped that 
its influence would be extended, the dream was stillborn. 
The Soviet Union did not try to apply direct pressure to 
the countries in the Pact but sought to undermine the 
• 
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Pact's strength by concentrating Soviet attention upon 
the rest of the.Mid-East. The friendliness which the 
Soviet Union had promised came into being and the struggle 
between East and West was shifted to a different plane.14 
The greatest enthusiasm which was expressed in favor 
of the Soviet declaration came from Syria. Farid el-Khani, 
in the name of the Syrian Government, "expressed gratitude 
to the Soviet Government in this delicate situation for 
the interest and attention it is showing in Near and 
~liddle Eastern events and for the intention expressed by 
the Soviet Government to refer this matter to the United 
Nations if the Western Powers continue their pressure."15 
Clearly, the constant warnings of Western pressure by the 
Soviet press 'tvere having their effect upon Syria. 
For strategic reasons, the Soviet Union had to halt 
the extension of pro-\~estern military po~ver but there was 
no counter-force in the area upon which to rely. But 
there were possibilities in the fact that Iraq was the 
. ['J.'> 
only Arab member of the Pact. Two goals of Soviet policy 
presented themselves: the alienation of the Iraqi 
people's loyalty from their government and toward Egypt; 
and the prevention of other Arab states joining the 
Baghdad Pact. If these two aims could be accomplished, 
Iraq 1 s value as a Pact member v1ould be materially lessened, 
.. 
and the Pact itself, vitiated. 
Therefore, the first order of business for the Soviet 
. Union was the enhancement of Egyptian prestige ameng the 
b 
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Arabs. The Soviets did not try to establish a military 
base in. Egypt to counter the Iraqis, al tl1ough this may 
A • 
have been an ultimate goal. Rather, the Russians sought 
to keep the situation throughout the Hiddle East relative-
ly fluid so as to have more freedom of movement. Iraq, 
if isolated, would probably gravitate back toward a more 
neutral position. If the Mid-East could be kept in a 
state of flux until the prestige of ·Egypt had been in-
creased, the Arab states would come under its influence.16 
Soviet wooing of Egypt had started even before the 
signing of the Baghdad Pact, when Russia realized that 
if Iraq moved West it 'tvould be Egypt ,vhich would react 
most violently. In March of 1955 Cairo concluded its 
\ 
talks with Syria concerning a defensive alliance. They 
had asked Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan to join, but 
the latter two .countries refused. Saudi Arabia, however, 
was favorable.17 This incident enabled the Soviet Union 
\ ;Al 
to judge the positions of the various Arab states and in 
those which were not pro-West, Soviet representatives 
were busy inviting people to visit Moscow, offering aid, 
and organizing exchanges.18 
During April of 1955 the Bandung Conference had given 
the appearance that the underdeveloped countries were 
gradually moving toward a pro-Soviet standing. The 
Soviets looked forward to increased friendly contacts 
with countries containing great masses of potential 
Communist followers.19 While at the Conference, Nasser 
) 
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was outspoken in his anti-Western opinions and thereby 
ingratiated himself with the Russians. The Soviet bloc 
ackno,;vledged the services of Nasser by purchasing large 
amounts of cotton which Egypt was having d·'ifficul ty in 
selling. In 1953-1954 Egypt had exrorted 817,000 bales 
but in the following year, only 53,900. The purchases 
of the Soviet bloc went a long way in making up the 
deficit.20 
Egyptian difficulties in selling her cotton crop in 
Western markets were the result of conditions in Europe. 
The post-\vorld \#lar II situation, economic policy, and 
overproduction in certain fields lessened the European 
demand for 1,1iddle Eastern products. Also, the diminished 
power of Europe in international affairs no longer 
allowed the old colonizers the freedom to direct the pro-
gress of the Mid-Eastern states. These factors gave the 
Arab states more freedom of movement to accept offers 
from the Soviet Union, as in the sale of Egyptian cotton.21 
In exchange, Egypt could receive armaments and producer 
goods. But, mor~ than this temporary palliative, Egypt 
believed that in the future the Conununist bloc would be 
more than happy to absorb the cotton production which 
could not be sold in the \.lest. Perhaps this, more than 
anything, was the factor ivhich moved Egyp.t toward the 
East.22 
Such were the reasons for Egypt's pro-Soviet flirta-
tion. Syria, on the other hand, moved East because of 
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domestic conditions. For example, her economic situa-
'- tion made ~he Soviet Union appear in the same light as 
that with which Egypt viewed the giant. Further, there 
were several strong pro-Soviet minorities in Syria such 
as the Kurds, the Armenians, and the Eastern Rite 
Christians. Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union had 
backed Syria in her arguments with pro-Western 1'urkey 
and Israel, was no small factor in Syria's Eastern orien-
tation.23 
But economic, technical, and political support are 
not the only reasons for the Arab's friendliness toward 
the Soviet Union. The sympathy which the Soviets express 
for the social problems of the area gives the Arabs the 
impression that the Russians are true friends. In the 
picture_ of the Soviet Union which the Arabs have, they 
see a country just emerging from a modernization process 
and with many unsolved problems, but which • still is 
willing to do its bit for the downtrodden. By not • using 
overt penetration but through economic assistance, the 
Soviet Union attempted to fulfill the esteemed role which 
the Arabs had cast for her.24 
Perhaps the most important event of 1955 in Soviet-
Arab relations was the sale of Czechoslovak arms to Egypt. 
Egypt was determined to increase her military strength 
after an Israeli attack on Gaza in February of 1955 had 
fully revealed the impotence of Nasser's domain. Hassen 
LI' ,ti I 
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Fahmj Ragab, the Egyptian Under-Secretary of War, was 
,, 
sent abroad to various Eastern and Western states for 
the purpose of buying arms. However, his mission was 
cooly received in the West, a fact which left no alter-
native as to where the arms must come from. On Egypt's 
initiative the matter was brought before the Soviet 
Ambassador, Daniel E. Solod, and within a few weeks, the 
Soviet Union offered surplus arms which could be paid 
for in installments. As negotiations became more serious,· 
the .American Ambassador was informed that unless Egypt 
could obtain arms from the United States, she would go 
to Russia. However, Nasser hesitated making a move 
toward the Soviet Union, no doubt because his opinion of 
that power had not changed much from that which he held 
previously. The United States agreed and presented Egypt 
with a list of those goods which it could purchase •. Egypt 
could obtain twenty-seven million dollars worth of arms 
but the matter of payment was not acceptable to Nasser, 
especially since it appeared as though the Soviet Union 
would offer a better deal. 
Egypt's Liberation day was celebrated on July 23, 
and for the occasion the Soviet Union sent a group of 
officials headed by Dimitri Shepilov, edi.tor of Pravda. 
It may be that Shepilov was sent so that any talks with 
Nasser ,vould not appear to be official and thus questioned 
at the Geneva Summit Conference which was undertvay at the 
same time. 25 Al though it was suspected· that something 
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serious was being discussed,~no one could say that the 
t·~pic was armament. 
The next month Ambassador Solod invited Nasser to 
visit the Soviet Union; Nasser accepted and said he would 
come in the spring. But Nasser asserted that the visit 
did not mean "our anti-Communist principles', were being 
forgotten. Even so, Mr. Solod had assured him that the 
Soviet Union had no connection with the Communists in 
Egypt. "Nothing prevents us from stre·ngthening our eco-
nomic ties with Russia even if we arrest Communists at 
home and put them on trial".26 
Izvestia explained the reason for the honoring of 
/ 
Nasser as follo~vs: 
-< 
Indeed, the peoples of Egypt and the Soviet Union 
do not have the same state system, and their social-
political systems are different as well. But they 
have much in common, primarily their desire to live 
in peace and to base their relations ,vi th other 
nations on the principles of peaceful coexistence. 
Egypt is making great efforts to strengthen peace 
in the Near East by opposing the policy of forming 
military blocs in this area.27 
The Soviet sale of arms to Egypt had been suspected, 
but it was not until September 27 that Nasser made it 
official when he announced the purchase at a military 
exhibition in Gezira. He excused the deal by telling of 
his constant attempts to buy in the West. But alas, the 
.Americans and the French put forth terms which would have 
compromised Egypt's independence and dignity. Czechoslo-
vakia had been the only one to make a reasonable offer. 
url'his transaction [said Nasser] will have a purely 
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commercial character like any other commercial operation''. 
He countered ~~pected Western criticism by asserting that 
the arms deal did not mean Soviet domination of the }lid-
,... ..... 
East, but it did signify the end of foreign control.Lti 
lb.e exact nature of the agreement was never publicized. 
However, some of the provisions were the delivery of a 
large number of MIG fighters, IL-28 bombers, guns, command 
cars, tanks, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank guns, bazookas, 
and other arms. For these, Egypt would pay with cotton 
-~nd a small amount of cash. Each installment was to con-
sist of 5% of Egypt 1 s cotton export, the total value of 
each being worth about eighty million dollars.29 
Reaction to the Soviet-Egyptian deal was mixed and 
depended upon various factors. Most agreed, however, 
that a new situation had arisen in spite of the fact that 
Egypt insisted the transaction was only commercial in 
character.30 In the Middle East the arms deal was approved 
by public opinion and leaders alike, though whether or not 
some of the praise was sincere, is doubtful. Even Nuri 
as Said who was outspol<.en in his· anti-Nasser opinions, 
felt compelled to offer his support. Overnight, Nasser's 
prestige underwent a sharp increase throughout the l".li.ddle 
East, and the Soviet Union received full credit for making 
the liberation of the Arabs a possibility.31 
But there 'tvere signs that beneath the praise ran a 
current of fear and doubt as to whether Nasser could be 
trusted with all these arms. This may have influenced the 
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Iranian decision to join the Baghdad Pact on October 9, 
1955, although the Foreign Vtlnistry denied that such was 
the cause. And in December of 1955, Jordan announced its 
plan to join the Pact, a decision which had to be_~ejected 
when mob violence forced I<.ing Hussein to back dovm. ~,Later, 
the British expressed the opinion that the riots were 
fomented by outside agitators, no doubt an allusion to 
Nasserites.32 
As the West saw things, there was no danger in·the 
arms deal per~' but there was the possibility that Egypt 
would find itself more and more dependent upon the Soviet 
Union. If Egypt's neutrality was compromised, it might 
move closer to the East and in turn, assume a more hostile 
attitude toward the West.33 
Even though the Soviet Un.ion had accomplished a 
commendable feat, it hesitated to announce the deed to the 
world. There were several reasons for the silence of the 
Soviet press. We have already mentioned the fact that 
Russia did not want to upset the proceedings at the Geneva 
Conference. Also, }bscow knew that its supplying arms to 
a military dictatorship would not be approved by radical 
non-Communist left-wing opinion outside of the Soviet 
bloc. The arms deal would tarnish the picture of the 
Soviet Union as the champion of peace among these leftist 
groups.34 
On October 2, 1955 the Soviet Union, feeling that it 
could not remain silent forever, published a general state-
·ment excusing the action. 
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The Soviet Government believes that every state has 
the right to defend itself and ·to purchase ,veapons 
for its defense fron1 other sta·tes or1 a normal commer-
cial basis 51 £:1ncl tl1at no s-"cate. 11.as the right to in·ter-
f ere in ·this or to malce any l~ind of unilateral 
dernar1ds violating the rights or interes·ts of other 
stateso35 
There was, however, no mention of the political reper-
cussions of the deal. 
But Czechoslovakia, supposedly the country primarily 
responsible for the arms sale, was not as hesitant in 
praising the transaction. The Czechs praised Egypt for 
its support of a policy of "international cooperation and 
world peace". Orana Lidu blamed Israel for the tension 
with Egypt and said of Moshe Sharett's statement {that the 
arms deal would bring a deterioration of the Hid-Eastern 
situation), that it was t•audacious and ridiculous". 
It was not until November l that the Soviet Union 
spoke more freely of the arms deal. Russia placed the 
blame squarely upon Israel's shoulders and said the latter 
should not complain about its arms shortage since "its 
aggressive appeals did not reflect any shortage of arms". 
The Soviet press also said that the Three-Po'tver Declara-
tion of 1950 was now a dead issue since it had no legal 
foundation whatsoever. Israel.was now attacked as the 
major cause of the lYlid-Eastern troubles ,v-hile Egypt was 
praised as having goals in common with the Soviet Union. 
"Both Egypt and the Soviet Union stand squarely on a 
platform of peace and oppose the policy of aggression'' .36 
' There are several questions which should be asked 
. ' . 
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at this point concerning the arms deal. For example, 
' 
why did Egypt purchase arms from the Soviet Union?, and 
why did the Soviet Union sell them? 
\~e have already mentioned the fact that the Western 
terms for the sale were not to Egypt's liking. Al~o, 
there was the Egyptian rivalry with Iraq for Arab leader-
ship with the latter power being aided by the West.37 
Nasser had said that as a condition for the sale, Britain 
and the United States demanded Egyptian ''membership in a 
security pact", while the Soviet Union had no such re-
quirement in its package. He also stated that in spite 
of the deal, Egypt would not tolerate domestic Communism. 
\-le are strong enough to cope ,vith all internal sub-
version, including Communism. Communism is banned 
in Egypt. "\~e have five or six underground Communist 
organizations, but we know all about them. They have 
no able leadership. 11any other Communists are in 
prison.38 
What was the effect of the Baghdad Pact upon Egypt's 
purchase of arms? Britain's Foreign Secretary held that 
the Pact had no effect since Soviet penetration of the 
area had been going on for some time. Ho'tvever, it must 
be remembered that Khrushchev had not succeeded Malenkov 
as the real Soviet leader until February 1955. A new 
turn in policy as reflected by the arms deal would not 
seem to have been a Malenkov, but rather a Khrushchev, 
decision. Therefore, it would appear to have been the 
case that the idea of an arms deal came after the forma-
tion of the Baghdad Pact.39 For Nasser the Pact was a 
strong challenge to his influence in the llid-East. Such 
I 
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an alliance would split the Arab world into two, thus 
putting a crimp into any plan for Arab unity. The Pact 
was not a threat to Egyptian security but it was a block 
to Nasser's grandiose-plans. 
There was also discussed above the attacl< in -Gaza by 
Israel in February of 1955 and this was the reason most 
often given by Egyptian spokesmen for the necessity of 
arms. But.this was only one reason out of many. For 
many years Egypt had been thinking of the possible bene-
fits in a Soviet connection. During the early 1950's the 
Wafd had given serious thought to the idea as being a way 
of ending Egyptian dependence upon the West. It would 
seem as though this earlier version was based upon a 
desire to spite the former colonizers rather than a ration-
al decision made in the best interests of Egypt. 
For Egypt, the arms deal meant the. end of the period 
in which there was an exclusive concern with domestic 
problems. Nasser and Naguib had come to power on a plat-
"form of domestic reforms with national prestige to be 
considered at a later date. By 1955, rival political 
parties had been eliminated and the ''neiv" Egypt created • 
. The arms deal signified that the house had been put in 
order and Egypt was ready to move on to bigger things.40 
The Soviet Union also received great benefit from 
the sale. There were several factors which made the 
time propitious for a more active Ivlid-Eastern ·policy. 
For one, there was no international organization to which 
," .~· ........... !!'•-·"I'"',·-.-'.., .. -- ---· 
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countries like Syria and Egypt could turrt' for aid in 
s~lling cotton surpluses. Coincidental'l .. y, the years 
1955 and 1956 saw a shortage in Soviet cotton produc-
tion, and this deficiency also had effects in the 
satellites. Thus, the sale of about $250 million worth 
of arms in exchange for cotton was a ready raade ans~1er 
for both Egyptian and Soviet proble·ms. L}l 
Another Soviet benefit 1ivas that opinion in the Arab 
states was favorable, for these people no'tv felt that 
Russia would fulfill their desires on reasonable terms 
without them giving away their pride and honor by accepting 
''conditions". In turn, this meant that Soviet overtures 
for trade would be more readily accepted in the area. 
Also, since Egypt had conunitted her future cotton produc-
tion to payment for the arms, the Soviet Union~had a lever 
to push in case of policy differences.4~ 
In terms of strategic alignment, the arms sale meant 
that the Soviets had again taken an active interest in 
the Middle East after a period of relative inactivity. 
The arms clause of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 had 
indeed been overridden as the Soviet press said it had, 
and this in turn meant that Israel had lost a certain 
measure of security. Israel, to compensate, was receiving 
arms from France and the former country began to think 
seriously of a preventive war. Further pleasure for the 
Soviets was supplied by the reaction of the United States 
. 
which was very disturbed by the sale. Dulles was ~.91oved 
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,t, 
to remark, tt'fue issue was, do nations 'tvhich play both 
sides get better treatment than nations which are stal-
wart ,;vi th us?" But such statements did not halt nego-
tiations between Egypt and Britain for the sale of cotton 
nor did it stop Egyptian talks with both Britain and the 
United States for aid in construction of the Aswan Dam.43 
Finally, the sale me.ant that the more anti-Western 
nations had a rallying point around which gathered Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. This group could conceivably 
have been developed - if all had gone well - into a 
counterweight to the Pact powers of Turlcey, Pakistan, 
' 
Iraq, Iran, and Britain.44 
With the conclusion of the arms deal, the Soviet 
Union experienced new attitude toward Egypt. No longer 
was l\Jasser a 11fascist" or a "reactionary", instead, the 
anti-Communist activities of the Egyptian Government were 
ignored. Diplomatic and Trade missions from the Soviet 
bloc countries became active in the Middle East. 
But beneath all the apparent harmony, there were 
factors which would cause some friction in the years to 
come. For one thing, Cairo and Moscow would not always 
have the same· aims,. The primary Arab concern was Israel 
and pan-Arabism. But the Soviet Union was not too 
concerned with Israel and did not feel all the effort 
expended for its destruction worthwhile. The main cause 
of · Soviet-Arab friction lvould be the fact that Moscow did 
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not relish the idea of a unified Arab state on its southern 
flank.45 
However, such thoughts about the future did deter the 
present love affair. In September of 1955, there was held 
the grand opening of a ''permanent" VOKS. exhibit in Cairo. 
For the occasion the highest ranking Egyptian dignitaries 
presented themselves, while the Soviet Union commissioned 
a VOKS "plenipotentiary'' for Egypt. 46 Egypt was invited 
to send a delegation of physicians and journalists to 
¥~scow, and on September 6, 1955, a trade deal was announced 
involving Egyptian rice for Soviet petroleum.47 
Syria, following the Egyptian example, started talks 
for the purchase of arms in November 1955. These were 
delivered in March 1956 by Czechoslovakia, and in quality 
and type, were similar to those received by Egypt. Soviet 
instructors trained Syrian pilots in Egypt, and many 
Soviet technicians soon were living in Syria. Syria now 
took on importance as a Soviet depot of arms for the Mid-
East. Latakia was made into a port from which arms made 
their way throughout the }liddle East, while it was planned 
to construct a submarine base near the port. The Soviet 
Embassy in Syria had an increase in staff of five times, 
plus three military attaches.48 Thus, it would appear as 
though Syria was fast becoming more amenable to Soviet 
influence than was Egypt. 
As a first reaction to the Soviet moves in the }liddle 
East, the United States sought to regain some influence 
• 
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by offering financial assistance to Egypt for its Aswan 
Dam project.·49 The Aswan Dam was a serious project upon 
'tvhich Nasser based the prestige -of his whole economic 
and social policy. Nasser may have been unrealistic ·in 
expecting Britain and the United States to come through 
with aid for such a project, especially in view of his 
arms purchase and attacks on the Baghdad ~act. Neverthe-
less, he did get an offer from the West of a $70 million 
loan which was conditional upon Egypt getting another loan 
of $200 million from the International Bank.so 
But the loan, which was offered in December of 1955, 
was not immediately accepted by Egypt. It seemed as 
though Nasser was again looking to the Soviet Union for a 
better deal and in the months to come, the Egyptian stra-
tegy of playing both sides would become quite evident.51 
Thus, by the end of 1955, new vistas had open~d-for 
the Soviet and new headaches were given to the West. A 
new strategy had been launched by Nikita Khrushchev which 
took a more realistic view of the nature of the under-
developed countries but which contradicted many interpre-
tations of Marx-Lenin. The next chapter shall examine 
how these doctrinal difficulties were resolved. 
.~ 
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0 IV Ideological Reinterpretation 
\, 
The year 1956 was very important, for the appli-
.cation of Communist ideology was re-evaluated and new 
theories "t\7ere developed. In 1956 was held the 20th 
Party Congress of the Soviet Union during which some 
friendly underdeveloped countries received many compli-
ments. 
That same year the oriental authority Zhukov, also 
praised those countries which had thrown off their 
imperialist yoke, but he warned that their so-called 
socialist programs should not be confused with the Soviet 
variety. He asserted that "the active role of the work-
ing class and of its militant advanced guard, the Corrununist 
Party, is increasing everywhere; it is natural~ therefore, 
to expect that in the future the working class will achieve 
universal predominance in their struggle. This, however, 
is a long and complicated process. ,,1 
The underdeveloped countries were now considered to 
have a progressive function even though they were not 
perfect, i.e. Conununist. Behind this change in opinion 
of the role of countries such as Egypt, lay a deeper 
ideological foundation. In the opinion of the Cormnunists, 
the non-Communist states of Asia and Africa could be 
divided into three categories. Those that are indepen-
dent and neutralist are regarded as being •tgenuinely" 
independent. Then there are those sovereign states which 
,: .... 
\ 
'· 
-53-
... 
,, 
. ,
have joined alliances with the \lest and these are not 
considered independent; at most, they are semi-colonies, 
and victims of indirect imperialism. Finally, there are 
the colonies still under the control of European powers. 
Although a state such as Egypt considers itself to 
be following a socialist pattern, the Soviet Union would 
have disagreed with this. Alexander Guber has s.tated, 
"We should not be mislead by the adoption of programs for 
the 1 building of a society of the Socialist type,' for 
the •building of Socialism,' by the Socialist names taken 
by the bourgeois parties, etc.'•. The authority Balabus-
kevitch has argued that the national bourgeoisie was 
stepping up its efforts to steer the masses from the true 
course and into their own channels. He claimed that the 
national bourgeoisie has tried to counteract the spread 
of ~larxist ideas by representing itself as the true expo-
nent of national interest. ''The achievement in certain 
countries of state-Capitalist measures, and the presence 
of elements of economic planning, are advanced as proof 
of development along a Socialist path, but one which 
talces account of national peculiarities". 
However, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, these 
states are still not truly free in that, though they have 
secured differing degrees of political independence, they 
are still economically dependent upon foreign capital. 
The Soviet Union claims that the main goal for these states 
/ 
... · .. 'Ir 
must be economic independence, by which is meant the ex-
propriation of Western capital and the cessation of 
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economic ties with the \~est. 
Although foreign investment by capitalistic states 
is considered to be evil, the Soviet Union still approves 
of state-Capitalistic enterprises in the new states. 
I ' I Zhukov has said: 
Given a comparatively low level of economic and technological development in the East - not for nothing is the term ''underdeveloped 0 frequently applied to these countries - and given the eco-nomic d.iversity of tl-1ese coun·tries, the progressive tendency to,~1a.rd the. tra11sformation of ·the state (more correctly the state-Capitalist) sector of the economies of the non~Socialist countries of the East into an important factor strengthening their economies and sovereignty should not be under-rated.2 
This, then, was the new insight gained in 1956 by 
the Soviet Union, namely, that though the Capitalist 
system in the world was in a state of crisis, the bourgeoisie 
of certain countries such as Egypt could still play a pro-
gressive role. ~.¥ Soviet Eastern authorities were not 
thinking in terms of economic expansion, but in terms of 
the socio-political situation in the Orient. The Western 
bourgeoisie, they said, had used up. its usefulness and 
potentialities as far as the organization of production 
was concerned. In·the East, however, there were still 
rerrmants of feudalism, and the fight against them is the 
task of the national bourgeoisie. In the nineteenth 
century the bourgeoisie acted as the force ending what 
·-
was left of feudalism, and in the twentieth century, the 
Easte·rn national bourgeoisie shall fulfill the same role.3 
Therefore, the present role of the Eastern bourgeoisie 
-55-
nrost be to back up a strongly anti-Western foreign policy. 
This group must become anti-imperialist while at the same 
time remaining an exploiting class, the enemy of the 
Communist Party. But what exactly is the national bourgeoisie? 
This group has been defined by A. I. Levkovsky as that 
section of the local bourgeoisie for whom ttnational capi-
talist production is the foundation of its existence.u He 
drew a distinction between the ''usurer merchant bourgeoisie1' 
and the ''comprador bourgeoisie." The national bourgeoisie 
included some sections of ·the monopolist bourgeoisie. 
According to I. 1,1. Reisner, the monopoly interests have a 
double character, tt0n the one hand, they represent forms 
of Capitalism that exhibit decay and parasitism and hinder 
Capitalist development; at the same time, they show them-
selves to be bearers of an extremely important entrepre-
neurship. 1 ' 
However, there is no satisfactory social or economic 
basis by which one coul:d define the· national bourgeoisie. 
The problem, as has been mentioned, is political and 
therefore, those bourgeoisie supporting the policies of 
the Soviet Union are the more progressive element.4 
This was quite a development, although it is arguable 
whether this is good }~rxism. These arguments have been 
used concerning the bourgeois elements in past debates, 
but different conclusions were drawn. One past counter~·· 
argument was that the national bourgeoisie was unwilling 
and incapable of removing the feudal elements and that 
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they would be more afraid of local workers than inter-
national imperialists. But if the present day experts 
' ' 
are correct, it is by virtue of the fact that they had 
taken cognizance of the political, rather than the econo-
mic, trends. Some of their present day assumptions are, 
of course, well-founded. For example, 
that a policy of statism would prepare the way for a 
non-Capitalist sacial order \41hen the ranl~s of the indus-
trial working class had been swelled, thereby giving a 
strong boost to the class strugg~e while halting the 
further growth of the national bourgeoisie. At present, 
however, the interests of the bourgeoisie and the interests 
of the people coincided, and so the former group had a 
progressive role to play. But this unity could never be 
complete, and thus could not last forever. But what the 
Soviet experts never ans\vered in 1956 was: ,vhat indepen-
" dent action should be taken by the progressive forces 
against the national bourgeoisie if the unity of interest 
would disappear? And when, under what conditions, would 
\ 
the national bourgeoisie cease to fulfill its progressive 
function? 
Undoubtedly, the present state of affairs was not 
entirely to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union. The 
present foreign policy of the national bourgeoisie is 
not pro-Soviet and did not al'tvays objectively follow the 
" 
interests of the Soviet Union. The ideological justifi-
cations were useful only during the imrnediate stage, with 
\:, 
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the hope that such doctrinal changes would pave the way 
for a more favorable future. Theoretically - Ma~,::ist 
style - it is not possible for the leaders of underdeveloped 
countries to build a truly Socialist society, and sooner 
or later this bourgeois class must be eliminated. For the 
present they fulfill their task; in the future, history 
shall demand their removal. However, how this was to be 
done was not said.5 
For the time being, we must overlook the capitalist 
element which has beeri emphasized by the Soviet Union. It 
could be argued, in fact, that "tvhat the Soviet Union is). 
attempting to do is to attract the intelligentia and the 
bureaucracy, and that their appeals to certain sections 
of the bourgeoisie are not in earnest. Perhaps they feel 
that the intellegentia•s indignation and sense of shame 
at the poverty of their country has made that group 
fertile soil for political agitation. The intellectuals 
in underdeveloped countries have a desire to serve the 
people and to lift them out of poverty, but this very 
same group has an interest in obtaining material rewards 
and social status commensurate with what they believe to 
be their value. Such people believe that the intellec-
tuals should be the ruling group heading a society based 
upon scientific and rational principles; therefore, the 
appeal of Ma~ism. The appeal of Communism for this 
• • • group is quite strong as it attracts both their desire to 
serve and their will to dominate. 
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Also, the appeal of Marxism is strong in that sector 
which is known as the bureaucracy. Here we must distinguish 
between colonial and independent countries, and between 
traditionalist and democratic regimes. There is no appeal 
in Communism for the administrations nurtured by European 
imperialist powers. But in those independent Asian states 
whic-h have a relatively democratic system of government, 
the appeal of Communism is quite great. There are two 
elernents of appeal, namely idealism a11d arnbition ,vith 
more emphasis on the second. The Soviet Union, by approv-
ing such trends as state-Capitalism, makes an es.pecially 
good impression upon the bureaucracy, for it is they, and 
not the private capitalists, whose interests are bound up 
in such enterprises. When the Soviet Union offers to give 
loans and set up factories, this bureaucratic group is 
most affected by such developments.6 
The ideological developments discussed above will 
help to illuminate the theory behind the trade and aid 
program of the Soviet Union. However, it would not be 
true to say that Soviet policy follows the ideology since, 
as we have seen, the re-evaluation of theory followed the 
trading programs launched by Russia since the death of 
Stalin. 
.. 
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V 1956: Suez 
In January and February of 1956 the United States, 
Britain, and France held conferences on the general Mid-
Eastern situation. Several proposals were offered, one 
of which called for the sending of military forces and 
arms to Israel and the dispatch of naval units to the 
area. The Soviet Union was not consulted about these 
matters since its actions had caused friction in the area 
and any appeal would have been futile. In any event, the 
most likely course of Soviet action would have been to 
v 
suggest referring the matter to the United Nations where 
a Soviet veto could have ma.de short work of any Western 
proposal. l'he result of the conferences was that Dag 
Hanunerskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
was asl<.ed to visit the JtLddle East, talk to the Arabs and 
Israelis, and see ,;vhat he could do to lessen tension. 
This he did and achieved some success for which the Soviet 
Union tool~ credit claiming that tension had been lowered 
through its actions.l 
At this time, tl1e West had three policy goals in the 
11:Lddle East. These ,vere: the creation of friendly rela-
tions and a cooperative attitude in the countries in the 
area; the creation of defensive alliances in the area so 
as to prevent its becoming of strategic advantage to the 
Soviet Union; and the continued exploitation of the area's 
oil deposits. 
q_, 
The attainment of these objectives was in 
,. 
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part conditioned upon an infl~ of capital into the area~ 
so that the oil deposits could be developed and a friendly 
attitude created by an aid program.2 
Soviet policy, on the other hand, strove to assert 
Russian power and prestige throughout the }1:i.ddle East. The 
Soviet Union was concerned by the fact that the \·Jest did 
not take note of Russian interests in the Mid-East. For 
example, in February 1956, the United States and Britain 
reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 which 
asserted their responsibility for developments in the area. 
The Soviets responded by calling the Declaration a "spurious 
document" which "tvas 11colonialist" "imperialist'' and 
' ' 
dead.3 And when the suggestion was made to send military 
forces into the }lid-East, the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
asserted: 
The moving of troops into the territories of the 
countries of the Near and }addle East would represent 
an act clearly contrary to the interest of strength-
ening peace, v1hicl1 ~vould create a seat of dangerous 
friction and tension in the aforementioned areasoo••• 
The UoSoSoR. 1·1inistry of Foreig11 Affairs deems it 
necessary to state again that any action leading to 
complications in the area of the I~ear and I\·ti.ddle East 
and to increased tension in that area is bound to be 
a subject of legitimate concern on the part of the Soviet Government.4 
Egypt, after the events of 19~5, declared that its 
policy \:vas one of ''positive neutralism", and thus would not 
favor either East or '\@lest. Hot•1ever, in spite of such 
~.~ 
assertions, · Egy·pt had been draim. quite close to the Soviet 
bloc ~vhile friction with the West lvas pronounced. The 
Egyptian press constantly denounced the Western reaction 
'i 
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to the arms deal with the result being more tension.5 
Friction between the Arabs and Israel had generated 
much heat during the early months of 1956. Bloody border 
clashes and retaliation ,vere freque11t and a war looked to 
be a good possibility. The situation was made more pre-
carious by the realization that the Arabs could receive 
Soviet support. But this support was not pro-Arab to the 
extent that the Soviet Union would have countenanced an 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow had supplied Egypt with 
arms as an anti-\1~estern measure, and did not v1ant them 
used for what it considered to be a petty quarrel.6 
What friction there 1.vas in the area the Soviet Union tried 
to place responsibility for it on the \.Jes.t. 
When the attempt, to force tl1e Arab countries into 
the Baghdad pact met with a stubborn resistance, 
certain -~tJestern PovJers proceeded to fan tl1e 1\rab-
Israeli conflict '\,1hich their ovm policy had 
originally provoked, encouraging Israel t~ violate 
the armistice agreernent.eeoo· Irritated by their 
failure 1 the l..Jestexn in1perial i st circles decided 
to resort to military intervention, using the 
artificially provoked ~ab-Israeli conflict as a 
pretext. The hypocritical talk~ about nthe necessity 
to stop the figr1ting" served merely to camouflage 
the intervention planned in the in·terests of the 
oil monopolies 1vl1ich reap fabulous profits by 
exploiting the resources of the l\•li.ddle East. 7 
While charges and counter-charges made their way back 
and forth, the Soviet Union continued its aid programs. 
In February Egypt signed an agreement with Russia calling 
for the establishment of a nuclear laboratory in Cairo 
which would be staffed by Soviet advisers and Egyptian 
scientists trJJ.ined in the Soviet Union.a 
·, 
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On the eve of the visit to Britain by Messrs •. 
Khrushchev and Bulganin the Soviet Union launched a 
peace drive in the }'1id-East. A staternent ivas published 
on April 17, which took a mild stand on the situation 
in the area and called for 1'a peaceful solution· in accord-
ance with the national interests of all countries con-
cerned."9 The statement contained several comments which 
highly displeased the Arabs such as the support offered 
the streng.thening of the integrity of all lviid-Eastern 
nations, Israel included. The.Soviet Union held that 
there must be no armed conflict in the area, and it asked 
"the interested parties to refrain from any kind of 
action which may lead to an exacerbation of the situation 
on the existing demarcation line set up by truce agree-
ments beaieen the Arab countries and Israel." It was also 
suggested that there be a compromise between the i\rabs and 
Israelis ''on a mutually acceptable basis, taking due con-
sideration of the just national interests of the interested 
parties." Such a solution would have meant Arab recogni-
tion of Israel and a peace treaty.lo It is no wonder that 
the Arabs were upset at such an apparent about-face on the 
part of the Soviet Union. 
There ,;-1ere other signs that Russia was pressing for 
a compromise. For example, the Soviet United Nations 
delegate, Arkadii Sobolev, remarked to Israeli ambassador, 
Abba Eban, that Russia had some proposals to help ease 
the Arab-Israel conflict. These proposals were never 
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revealed but there· ,vere comments in the leftist press of 
Egypt and Europe lvhich hinted at what they might be. 
Yussef Hilmi, a supporter of Egyptian Communism, wrote an 
article in a French journal calling for a settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, a just peace, and the silencing 
of radicals in both camps. Also, articles printed the 
very same week in Rose al Yussef and the London Qaily 
Worker made the same plea.11 All of these definitely 
point to the fact that the Soviet Union did not want to 
be compelled to support the Arabs if they went to v1ar 
with Israel. These hints by the Soviets show that a 
Middle Eastern war was not in the Soviet Union 1 s plans 
and tl1e Arabs had ·-better note that they might not receive 
Russian support if a war did develop. 
'When Khurshchev and Bulganin arrived in Britain for 
the talks, they were accused by Prime Minister Eden of 
increasing the danger of war in the Middle East by their 
supplying arms to Arab countries. The Russians replied 
by denouncing the Baghdad Pact and the arms shipments to 
Pact members. Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union 
would halt its arms shipments if the West did likewise. 
He also proposed a United Nations supervised general em-
bargo on arms shipments to the area. This Soviet plan 
was rejected because, had it been accepted, it would have 
meant the end of the Baghdad Pact, the isolation of the 
Arab states, and the possibility of continued arms ship-
ments to Egypt by ,vay of Communist China, which is not a 
...... · ~ 
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United Nations member. 
During the talks Eden warned his guests that Britain 
would use force if necessary to preserve the status quo, 
which prompted Khrushchev to reply in kind. The result of 
the talks was negligible and the official conununique 
~' 
simply stated that both' powers ,..rould "do everything in 
their power to facilitate the maintanance of peace and 
security in the Near and ~tlddle East •••• The governments 
of the two countries call on the states concerned to take 
h . f . '' · measures to prevent t e increase o tension; ••• 
The talks with Eden and the launching of the peace 
drive were both failures for Soviet policy. The Arabs 
were angered at the Soviet suggestion that they should 
compromise with Israel. Also, they now knew that they 
could not count on Soviet support for any adventures they 
might launch against Israel. Egypt, in particular, did 
not like Russia holding talks with Britain concerning 
Arab affairs without having first consulted Cairo. Even 
more, the fact that the Soviet Union had spoken favorably 
of an arms embargo meant that Egypt might lose the future 
support of that great power for Nasser 1 s dream of Egyptian 
hegemony in the Arab bloc. 
Egyptian dissatisfaction over the new Soviet atti-
tude may have been in part, a cause for Nasser's recogni-
tion of Communist China in 1'1ay 1956. One Egyptian official 
remarked that Egypt ''could get all the arms needed from 
Communist China even if the U.N. imposed an embargo on 
.. 
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weapons to the 1-'Iiddle East." An article in Al Gumhuria 
stated: 
Gamal Abdel Nasser has recognized China and dealt a blo'tv to the projected ~qestern blockade of the .Arab states 0000 People's China is the biggest producer of arma1nen·t at present and can supply the Arabs all the war material they neede Thus, Gamal Abdel tJasser put Eden's noose around Eden's own 
neckol2 
No doubt such cormnents were aimed as much at the Soviet 
Union as they were at the West. 
The Soviet Union, realizing that it had erred, did 
what it could to recoup its losses. In ~une, Demitri T. 
Shepilov, now the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited Egypt • 
.An article appeared in Pravda commenting upon the visit 
and hinting that the Soviets were ready to appease the 
wrath of the Arabs. It said: 
'. The Soviet Union, a developed industrial power, is giving Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon technical aid in creating new enterprises and is supplying them 
witl1 equipment and machines on mutually advanta-geous, purely commercial terms. It is natural tha_t fur·ther expansion of ecor1omic ties benveen 
our countries, for which great potentialities 
exist, corresponds to the requirements of both 
countries •••• 13 
On June 18, Shepilov made a speech calling for the 
principles of solidarity expressed at Bandung the year 
before. He assured his listeners that Russia had no 
ambitions in the ~lid-East and said that the Soviet 
peoples ~vould be "good friends and companions". Shepilov 
also promised Soviet support for the .Arab drive to elimi-
nate poverty and develop their political institutions.14 
But Shepilov did not come to Egypt simply to make 
,. 
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speeches; Soviet relations with that country had to be 
repaired. Egypt was close to agreement with the United 
States on a loan for the Aswan project and the Soviets 
had to coun~er this expected increase .in American influ-
ence. Such a project would mean that the United States 
would be active in Egypt for about ten years, a long time 
in which to draw Nasser Westward. Thus Shepilov came to 
Egypt with offers of Soviet financial and industrial aid.15 
Corrunenting on the conversations, Nasser later said: 
Shepilov announced the willingness of the u.s.s.R. to render economic assistance to Egypt including long-term credits. He said that any kind of aid \vould be grantecl by the Soviet Union \·Ji tl1out condi-
tions. Sl1epilov told me: \·Je don t t ·try to get raw 
materials, because we have our ovm ralv materials .16 
However, the Soviet Union did not mention the possi-
bility of its financing the Aswan Dam, most likely because 
it would have been too much for Soviet resources to handle. 
Also, Egypt could not have repaid the loan in the usual 
period allowed by the Soviet Union for payment. 
Yet, the United States was not a reliable alternative 
loan agency for the Aswan project. Nasser was denouncing 
the British and French too vehemently, and expressing too 
much sympathy for the Soviet Union. The recognition of 
Communist China, the trade with Russia's satellites, 
Egypt's growing indebtedness to the Soviets, were factors 
militating against a favorable American reaction to 
Egypt's request for aid. Also, the West could not be sure 
that Egypt could fulfill the conditions of the loan; 
namely, could Egypt raise her $900 million share. The 
.,.· 
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United States decided that it would be best to reject 
the Egyptian request, which it did on July 19.17 
Refused by both East and West in his appeal for aid, 
Nasser found a ready means of revenge: he nationalized 
the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. His decision to do so 
was annotmced in a speech he gave on that day. He pro-
mised that the Suez Canal Company would receive compen-
sation and also that shipping operations would continue 
as before. rBri tain and France, the t~vo countries having 
the greatest interest in the canal, denounced the action 
while the Arabs looked on somewhat approvingly.18 
On July 29, the American Deputy Under Secretary of 
State, lvir. 1,1urphy, met in London ·w·i th the British and 
French Foreign Ministers. Al.ready the French and British 
had taken precautionary measures to meet any eventuality 
arising out of the crisis. The next day, Sir .Anthony 
Eden delivered a short address in the House of Commons 
declaring that Britain found it impossible to acquiesce 
in a plan which put the operations and control of the 
Suez Canal into the hands of any one country. Later, it 
was revealed that the ·British War Office had put into 
effect "certain precautionary measures of a military 
nature.nl9 
'The Soviet Uni.on quickly responded by falling behind 
Egypt. On July 31, Premier Khrushchev gave a speech in 
Moscow in which he said that "the nationalization of the 
I) 
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Suez Canal is an act to which a sovereign government 
, such as the Egyptian government has a right:," He also . 
.. 
· .. ·~-~ 
/ 
called attention to Egypt's declared intention to respect 
freedom of shipping and to compensate the Suez Canal 
j 
Company for its loss.20 
On August 2, London announced the decision to call 
for a conference of those Powers having an interest in 
the Canal, for the purpose of drawing up an international 
administration. Twenty~four Powers in all were to attend 
the conference, hosted by Britain, France, and the United 
States and which tvould convene in London August 16. 21 
The Soviet Union, on August 9, responded to the invitation 
to attend by declaring that Egypt was correct in her 
actions and that any British-French military preparations 
should cease. The Soviets also protested the holding of 
such a conference and said, "The Soviet Government consi-
ders that the above mentioned conference cannot in any 
way be regarded, either in its composition or in character 
and purpose, as an international meeting authorized to 
take any decisions whatever in the Suez Canal. 0 22 
-- --
Nasser, also, did not accept the British plan for a 
conference. He told reporters that he could agree to a 
conference only if the purpose would be to alter the 1888 
Canal convention and to replace it by another. Since 
Britain insisted on its own purposes for the conference, 
Egypt would not attend. And on the date the London Con-
ference was to convene, the Arabs showed their displeasure 
0 
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by staging a general strike in Egypt as well as lesser 
ones in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Jordan.23 
The Conference met only to find itself deadlocked 
over which of two proposals expressed the opinion of 
those present. The Dulles proposal, supported by eight-
• 
/, 
een of the nations present, called for 
Institutional arrangements for cooperation between 
Egypt ancl other interested nations in the operation, 
maintenance and development of the Canal and for 
harmonizing and safeguarding their respe.ctj_ve 
interests in the Canalo To this end, operating, 
maintaining, and developing the Canal and enlarging 
it so as to increase the volume of traffic in the 
interest of world trade and of Egypt would be the 
respor1sibility of a Suez Canal Board. Egypt '\,Jould 
grant this Board all rights and facilities afpro-
priate to its functioning as here outlined.2 
The second proposal was that submitted by l·jenon, the 
Indian delegate, and this received the support of four 
countries, including the Soviet Union. Under this plan, 
any negotiations had to be based upon the fact that Egypt 
had sovereign control of the Canal and that any group 
created to represent international interest in the Canal 
would simply be consultative and advisory in nature.25 
If this plan had won unanimous acceptance, it would have 
meant that Egypt would come away from the struggle with 
complete ownership, burdened only by a noisome body of 
advisors. Nasser would have greatly enhanced his pres-
tige; Britain and France would be booted out of Egypt; 
and the Soviet Union would appear as the great backer of 
Arab aspirations. Three days of debate failed to break 
the eighteen to four split. Finally, the majority 
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decided to depute five representatives to Nasser for the 
purpose of presenting him with the proposals agreed upon 
by the group of eighteen. The proposals of tl1is group, 
as expected, were rejected by Nasser. 
The opinion of the Soviet press was that the -Dulles 
plan "would in fact mean the establishme.nt of a definite 
form of colonialism in the now independent Republic of 
Egypt.'t The editorial ,vent on to claim that the \~est 
tried to split the Conference into two groups for the 
purpose of making the claim that the Dulles plan was the 
will of the Conference.26 
The Soviet Union added more of its weight to the 
controversy by a series of letters to Anthony Eden and 
Guy }~llet. The content of these letters appears to show 
that .. the Soviet Union had become alarmed at the possibili-
ties for military measures in the Ivliddle East. Bulganin, 
in a somewhat mild tone, pointed out the dangers inherent 
in an attack on Egypt. He declared that it was none of 
the Soviet Union's doing in nationalizing the Suez Canal 
and further remarked, ''we learned about the nationaliza-
tion· •••• only from the radiorr. 27 But he also added the 
v1arning: ttEgypt cannot be defeated, nor can .Algeria. I 
must declare to you, Mr. Prime ~linister, that the Soviet 
Un.ion, as a great power which is interested in the main-
tenance of peace, cannot stand aside from this question."28 
But Britain was not yet finished with Nasser. The 
, ·./r" British withdrew the pilots from the Canal; however, Egypt 
~· 
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got .. repl __ aceme.nts. Next, the attempt was made to have 
those ~sing the Canal to continue their payments to the 
Suez Canal Company, but because of insufficient backing 
from the United States, this plan did not work out. 
Still other attempts were made to solve the Suez 
problem. In an address to the House of Commons on 
September 12, Anthony Eden presented a plan agreed upon 
by Britain, France, and the United States, which .called 
for an association of Suez Canal Users. He explained 
the plan as an association of the Canal users employing 
pilots, and having responsibility for the maintenance of 
traffic flov1 through the Canal. Egypt ,;vould be asked to 
cooperate with the group and would receive payment accord-
ing to the facilities which were provided. The dues, 
however, would go to the association, and not to Egypt. 
In the event that Egypt refused to accept the User's 
Authority, a breach of the 1888 Convention would be de-
clared and the necessary measures would be taken to ensure 
the Authority's contro1.29 
Whether or not the User's Authority could be justi-
fied by the 1888 Convention is doubtful, but Britain still 
wanted international control of the Canal. However, what-
.. 
ever possibilities the plan might have had were killed 
when Dulles declared that the Authority would .. have .American 
support, but not to the extent of forcing Egypt to acquiesce.30 
Yet, Britain went ahead with the idea and called for 
a con£erence of those eighteen nations which had supported 
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the Dulles Plan at the London talks. But this time the 
same countries were not favorable to the idea as envisaged 
,_by Britain. A User's Authority l'1as establisll'.ed but was 
weakened by the provision that, if a country saw fit, it 
could pay the dues to Egypt.31 Thus, Britain and France 
were again thwarted. 
By September 20, Izvestia was saying that the aggre-
sive West had failed in its plot. ''It can be said with-
out exaggeration that the supporters of a policy of force 
in the Suez question have met with such opposition to 
their adventurous schemes that they are beside themselves." 
Britain and France played another card, though they 
would have preferred to do otherwise. They requested a 
$ecurity Council meeting on September 26, so that the 
situation could come before the United Nations. Trud 
replied, "It is not the t threat to navigation 1 , not the 
'concern for economic ties' which frighten the monopo-
lists, but the possible nationalization of oil companies, 
•••• anti-imperialist movements •••• , and the loss of 
prestige".32 The Soviet Union began to, attack the i~est 
quite vehemently and presented the Suez crisis as a black 
versus white affair. 
In the Security Council, Britain asked that the 
United Nations assume an important role in the administra-
tion of the Suez Canal. But, as could be expected, Russia 
vetoed the idea of a User 1 s Association. 
By mid-October there seemed to be a lull in the storm. 
I 
' I 
·' 
i 
' 
• I 
·, 
I 
I 
., 
I 
' 
I 
-73-
Operations at the Canal were going smoothly and the Canal 
users were accustomed to Egyptian olmership. But the 
calm tvas-· brolcen when the Soviet Union 'tvarned of possible 
\./estern n1ilitary intervention. On October 27, Tass 
reported: 
According to information received from Tel Aviv, a netv military provoca·tion is under preparation in Israel. Israeli authorities are hastily mobilizing reservists •• o ~tillery and tanl-<.men are amor1g those being calle.do Large. numbers of passenger cars, buses, delivery trucks, trucks and even taxis are being mobilized. 
The Soviet Union should have__ been careful in placing 
the blame upon Israel for the mobilization measures. 
Between October 11 and 29, there were many violent border.· 
raids launched against Israel which, in turn, took repri-
sals against Jordan. On the 14th of October, it was 
reported that two Egyptian commandos were killed in Negev. 
The Truce Supervisor for the United Nations, General Burns, 
expressed the opinion that a disastrous frontier situation 
would occur and he believed the present situation to be 
the worst in two years. He placed responsibility upon 
"Jordanian infiltration combined with the Israeli policy ,. 
of severe retaliation.••33 
On October 28, the Israeli Government announced that 
"as a precautionary measure to safeguard her borders'' the 
Cabinet had authorized the recall of several battalions 
of reservists. Israel claimed the action was necessary 
because of the commando raids by Egyptians working out of 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan. Undoubtedly, the reservists 
-74-
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had been called up sometime before the announcement, 
because on October 29 Israeli troops crossed the Egyptian 
border and kept on going. 1"'he Israeli Foreign l~Jinistry 
said they had taken "the necessary measures to destroy 
Egyptian commando bases in the Sinai peninsula 11 .34 
The next day Britain handed both the Egyptian and 
Israeli ambassadors in London an ultimatum which declared 
that Britain and France would take up positions in the 
Suez Canal zone if hostilities were not immediately 
stopped. In an address to Parliament, Anthony Eden de-
fended the ultimatum as a necessity if safety of passage 
through the Canal was to be guaranteed. He also said 
that the Egyptian Government had been requested to grant 
the Anglo-French forces permission to occupy positions 
at Port Said, lsmaila, and Suez. 
Nasser immediately rejected the ultimatum and appealed 
to the Security Council for an immediate consideration of 
the .Anglo-French threat. Britain and France, true to 
I 
their word sent their forces into the Canal area, much to 
the dismay of the United States. President Eisenhower 
thought the action a mistak:e and said, "In the circum-
stances •••• there will be no United States involvement in 
these present hostilities".35 
The Soviet press s'Wllng into action by accusing Britain 
and France of brazen aggression and of attempting to re-
store colonial oppression in the East. Premier Bulganin 
asked Nehru of India to agree to a second Bandung conference 
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on the Canal crisis and President Voroshilov made the 
same request of President Sukarn~. Both Asian leaders 
(( 
rejec·ted the Soviet proposals, while Nehru even urged 
Bulganin to avoid "any step that .could lead to a world 
war."36 Pravda remarked indignantly: 
Flouting the U.N. Charter and the foundations of international lalv, the .Anglo-French imperialists have begun their intervention against the inde-penden·t Egyptian republic, in an effort to seize the Suez Canc1l by rnili tarj.r force and to irnpose their occupation on Egypt. This is being done 
at a tirne v1hen all the prerequisites had been 
created for a peaceful solution of the Suez prob-lem, in accord with the wishes of all peace-loving peoples, by the recent discussions of the problem in the Security Council.37 
On November 2, the United Nations General Assembly, 
by a 64 to 5 vote, approved a resolution offered by Mr. 
Dulles, calling for an end to military activity and a 
cease-fire. Britain and France were now isolated. Not 
only was their ally condemning their actions, but there 
were domestic outcries in both their countries denouncing 
the invasion. 
The Soviet Union was backing Egypt as much as possi-
ble short of military measures. There was a drive through-
out the Soviet Union to round up wheat, medical supplies 
and various other goods for Egypt. The Soviet Government 
also dispatched a series of letters, dated November 5, 
to Eisenhower, Eden, lvtollet, and Ben-Guriqn. The letter 
--, 
to Eisenhoive.r made the suggestion that Russia and the 
United States resolve to oppose the attack. This, it was 
said, would stop the aggression and no war would occur • 
• 
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Bulganin also suggested that both powers use their forces 
in the area, under United Nations direction, to guarantee 
the stopping of the aggression.38 Undoubtedly, ~his 
suggestion had to be pure propaganda. If the United States 
refused, as the Soviets knew it would, the claim could be 
made that America condoned the aggression. The other 
letters were similar to that sent to Anthony Eden, which 
warned that the Soviet Union was 
fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore 
peace in the East through the use of force. 
rde hope at ·this critic al moment ,you will display 
due prudence and draw the corresponding conclusions 
from this.39 
But wuch warnings were not taken seriously because of 
the Soviet statement that military activity against the 
aggressors should be taken under United Nations auspices. 
~eanwhile, in the United Nations, Canada offered a 
resolution suggesting that an international military force 
of the United Nations be set up and sent into Egypt to 
supervise the ending of hostilities. Egypt approved of 
; 
the idea and the General Assembly voted its approval on 
November 7. Kuznetsov, the Soviet delegate, abstained 
on the grounds that such an international force would 
only take the Suez Canal away from the sovereign control 
of the Egyptians.40 
In the November 7 issue of Pravda, there was pub-
lished an uAppeal of the Egyptian Government." In the 
article, Egjrpt made an appeal to "all people throughout 
the world who stil\l respect huinan dignity and justice, u 
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af king for volunteers, arms and other support. The Soviet 
Union responded, but not until it was too late; for on 
November 8 Israel announced that she was withdrawing her 
troops from Egyptian territory and would accept the pre-
sence of the United Nations military mission. The next 
day Anthony Eden reported to the House of Corrunons that 
Britain welcomed the Israeli decision and added that 
Britain would hand over the responsibilities assumed by 
her forces in the area just as soon as the United Nations 
forces were in a position to maintain normal operations. 
Now that the invaders had decided to withdraw their 
forces, the Soviet Union began to step-up its threatening 
attacks in the press. November 10 sa,,1 the issuance of a 
Soviet statement which expressed the sympathy felt by the 
Soviet people for the Egyptians fighting for their inde-
pendence and freedom. The statement told of the 
numerous applications of Soviet citizens among whom 
are a great number of pilots, tankmen, artillery 
men and. officers -r.1ho tool< part in the great ,var of 
the fatherland and are now in reserve, asking to be 
allowed to go to Egypt as volunteers to fight to-
get~r with the Egyptian people to drive the aggre-
ssors from the Egyptian land.41 
But such threats were discounted because there was 
no longer an excuse for Soviet action since Britain and 
France had already given notice of their departure. Why 
should the Soviet Union wait so long to announce the 
definite possibility of volunteers? For one thing, there 
was no apparent danger that would necessitate action. It 
was safe to rattle the sword and such warnings to the 
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colonialists made the Soviet Union appear on the scene 
a"s the saviour of oppressed l)eoples. And the Soviet 
Union was not hesitant in assuming responsibiiity for 
making the invaders quit Egypt. In the opinion of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences: 
The clear and firm position of the Soviet Union in 
1
defense of Egypt, its determination to take an 
active part in ·the restraining of the aggressors, 
in the restoration of peace in the Near East, in 
averting a ne~v \vorld vJar, proved to have a so be ring 
influence on the ruling circles of England and 
France and to have played a decisive role in the 
cessation of hostilities.42 
It \vould appear as though the Soviet Union may have 
been successful in carrying out the image of saviour. 
At a meeting of heads of state and kings from the Arab 
countries which was held in Beirut, there was a general 
feeling of sympathy expressed over the plight of Egypt. 
President Kuwatly of Syria tried to get Lebanon's 
President Chamoun to break diplomatic relations with 
Britain and France, but the attempt was opposed by the 
Saudi Arabians and Iraqis. A reason for their opposition \ 
might have been that too much turmoil in the llid-East 
might cause the revenues derived from oil to undergo a 
shar.p drop. 43 
President Kuwatly had written a letter to Bulganin 
in which he expressed approval of the Soviet Union I s posi-
tion. He said: 
The Soviet Union continues to support the cause of 
those countries struggling for their development, 
indeper1dence and sovereign·ty. On behalf of the 
Syrian people and myself, I take pleasure in 
e)cpressing •••• our mos.,c cordial thanl<s •••• 44 
.. 
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Of course, Egypt was most grateful to the Soviet 
Union. The Egyptian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
Mohannned A. el-Kouni, stated in a radio message: 
I believe that an historic moment has now come, 
a new stage in the strengthening of relations bet'{,.reen Egypt and the Soviet Union and in the 
consolidation of the cooperation between Egypt 
and the Soviet Union, and in the consolidation 
of cooperation between our countrieso Egypt 
has learned who her sincere friend is. Events have confirmed the noble sincerity of the Soviet Union.45 
'lfuy had Britain and France broken off the fighting 
·, 
and given the control of the Canal back to Egypt? The 
French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, listed four 
reasons which are, in order of importance: the division 
of British opinion; pressure from the United States; 
pressure from the United Nations; and the intervention 
of the Soviet Union.46 
But no matter what the reasons, the Soviet Union 
and Egypt seemed to win what they wanted. Nasser was 
in control of the Suez Canal, but in gaining this prize 
he had lost .any possibility of Western assistance for 
the Aswan Dam • .And the Soviet Union had won a tremendous 
increase of its prestige and influence in the ~liddle East 
which made up for the peace drive blunder earlier in the 
year. The defeat of the Anglo-French Suez policy was a 
big set-back for the Western position in the Middle East. 
Though defeated on the battlefield, Nasser had achieved 
a political victory. He had won the respect of the Arab 
world ind enhanced the prestige of Egypt. There were 
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repercussions coming from Egypt's attaining a new status. 
The leadership of Iraq no longer could be sure of its 
h)fid on the country, while in Syria it seemed as though 
forces were pushing that state farther to the left and 
closer to Nasser. Jordan broke its treaty with Great 
Britain and joined a unified military command with Egypt 
and Syria. Britain and France no longer could wield the 
... 
same amount of influence in the Middle East as they had 
just before the Suez Canal crisis.47 
The Sovi~t policy during the Suez crisis was very 
important for the future of Russian influence in the 
area. Russia had shown that it supported the Arab cause 
but the United States had also given its backing to 
Nasser. For the Soviet Union, it was not very important 
that Britain, France, and Israel were dealt a strong blow. 
Rather, the United States had to be pushed out of the 
area for this was the main Soviet objective. Now the 
Soviets had to prove to the Arabs that America was the 
real enemy. 
A propaganda campaign was launched to vilify the 
United States and to support Nasser in the United Nations 
talks on the armistice provisions. The Soviet press tried 
to create the impression that the Mid-East was a tinderbox, 
with the United States trying to oust Britain and France 
from the area so it could take their place. And when the 
Israeli position on freedom of shipping in the Gulf of 
Aqaba was accepted by the United States, the Soviet Union 
'' 
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was ··quick to denounce. the action.48 
So far, we have seen that Egypt and Syria had been 
the countries most inclined to be pro-Soviet in their 
outl-ool<. However, beginning in 1956, Yemen, which for 
the past twenty years had followed the lead of Saudi 
Arabia in international affairs, developed its own policy 
and sought close relations with Egypt and the Soviet 
Union. 
This new Yemeni policy was caused by both external 
and domestic factors. Yemeni-British relations became 
increasingly strained when the latter power pushed plans 
for the formation of a federation of states in the Aden 
Protectorate. Yemen resented this action since it had 
claimed the area was part of "Southern Yemen." Within 
Yemen the person having the most influence upon the new 
foreign policy was Crown Prince J.vlohammed Badr. He con-
stantly was condemning Western imperialism and praising 
the Pan-Arab cause. The Crown Prince was doing nothing 
more.than expressing general Arab sentiment, but even 
this was a new course for backlvard Yemen. 
The Crown Prince visited the Soviet Union in June 
of 1956 and in August he got the Government of Yemen to 
recognize Communist China. The Suez crisis further 
strengthened Yemen's pro-Soviet attitude with the result 
being arms deliveries to Yemen from Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union.49 The arms were valued about $9 million 
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and to this shipment was added agree~nts for economic 
development and technical aid "with no strings attached."50 
During the latter part of 1956 the Soviet aid pro-
gram had become quite active. -In addition to the aid 
given to Yemen, the Soviet Union also sold 200,000 tons 
of·wheat to Egypt for 600,000 Egyptian pounds. With the 
money received, the Soviet Union would buy Egyptian 
.. goods including cotton and rice. Also, it was decided 
that Russia would sell Egypt 300,000_ tons of fuel oil 
with the money again being used to purchase Egyptian 
goods.51 Syria got into the act when she signed a cul-
tural agreement with Russia calling for "an extensive 
exchange of experiences and achievements in literature, 
art, science, higher education, popular education, phys-
ical culture, sports and other fields."52 Also, as a 
sign of mutual respect, the Damascus legation of the 
Soviet Union and the Moscow legation of Syria were raised 
to Embassy status. And in December, Russia offered Syria 
an oil refinery and the technicians necessary to get its 
operation underway.53 
In all, 1956 was an important year for Soviet Mid-
Eastern policy. By the end of that year, Soviet prestige 
was very high and the trade-aid program was winning new 
friends. But if Egypt dominated the news in 1956, the 
following year found Syria causing the most problems. 
'.i 
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VI· Trouble With sn:ia 
~ . ' ~t' ""'' " ' 
The year 1957 began with a Mid-Eastern policy state-
ment by the United States, which came to be known as the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. The Soviet Union saw in this state-· 
ment a propaganda boon which would help in picturing the 
United States as a threat to the Arabs.l The Doctrine was 
the United States' answer to the power vacuum created by 
the withdrawal of French and ~ritish forces from Suez. 
To bolster those still pro-Western, Middle Eastern forces 
and the mobilizing of Congressional opinion were the main 
reasons for expounding the Doctrine. In effect, the 
United States offered economic aid and arms to those 
Middle Eastern countries which would take them, and the 
guarantee of American assistance to any Mid-Eastern 
country threatened by "armed aggression from any country 
controlled by international Communism.'' 
The manner of the Doctrine's promulgation was unfor-
tunate since the Arab governments concerned had not been 
consulted. Therefore, the United States had only made a 
unilateral declaration, lacking the firm consent and 
adherence of the Arab states.2 Another drawback for the 
Doctrine was that any countFy which agreed to accept the 
proffered aid, particularly in view of the declaration's 
other provisions, would be accused of submission to the 
West and betraying Arab nationalism. Also, the policy 
did not take cognizance of the realities of the area. 
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For one thing, the Soviet Union was not about to launch 
an attack against any Mid-Eastern country. The real 
danger was in subversion by pro-Nasser groups but Egypt 
was not a Communist country and thus, not the kind of 
aggressor menti·oned in the Doctrine. Therefore, other 
"' 
than for the offer of economic aid, the Doctrine was of 
no real val lle. 
The above considerations as to the Doctrine's value 
are born out by the fact that, outside the Baghdad Pact, 
only one Arab state accepted without conditions - Libya. 
Saudi Arabia and Lebanon were lukewarm in their adherence, 
while Syria, Egypt, and Yemen flatly turned it down.3 
From 1956 onward, there was a change in the domestic 
operations of the Egyptian Government. This resulted in 
the nationalization of foreign businesses and Egyptian 
property; close state control of business; intensive 
industrialization; and increased truces for higher income 
groups. The regime moved farther away from the West and 
took to using Marxist and class-warfare slogans. 
There were several reasons for this trend. One 
explanation is that Egypt was having trouble with its 
economic and social problems and so felt that more strin-
gent means were necessary to relieve their causes. Also, 
there is Nasser's desire to be a great leader of the 
masses, and one way to do this is to oppose the wealthy 
and ruling groups.4 
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All of these activities ma.de it ,appear to the \iest 
as though Egypt would completely fall under Soviet influ-
ence. The fear arose that Russia could order the closing 
of the Suez Canal, thus putting a great strain on \.Jestern 
Europe's economy. The Soviet view optimistically predic-
ted Egypt's joining the Con11Uunist bloc with a consequent 
increase of Soviet power in the }nddle East. This develop-
ment would confirm the belief that the Soviet trade and 
aid program for the underdeveloped countries would bring 
them into the Soviet sphere.5 
In view of its recent successes the Soviet Union felt ,, 
the time right to propose to the West that a joint decla-
ration of principles be enunciated for the Middle East. 
No doubt this was done in the hope that, if the West 
accepted, Russia would be acknowledged as having a vital 
interest in the area. According to the Soviet Union, the 
principles would be: 
1. The preservation of peace in the Near and }uddle East by setting questions at issue exclusively by peaceful means, on the basis of the method of 
negotiationso 
2. Noninterference in the internal affairs 
countries of the Near and ~nddle East. 
for the sovereignty and independence of 
countries. 
of the 
Respect 
these 
3. Refusal to undertake any attempts to draw these 
countries into military alignments with the par-
ticipation of the great powers. 
4. The liquidation of foreign bases and the with-drawal of foreign troops from the territory of 
countries of the Near and ~'liddle East. 
s. Joint refusal to supply arms to countries of the Near and }fiddle East. 
'· .. ·'·=-···-~ • 
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6. Assistance in the economic development of 
countries of tl1e Near and J.v1iddle East v1ithout 
putting forward any political, military, or 
other conditions, incompatible with the dignity 
and sovereignty of these countries,. 6 
One can see at a glance that, if accepted, the 
Baghdad Pact and any other conceivable type Western 
r ,: 
defensive system in the area would be impossible. The 
Middle East would be a subversives heaven, and so the 
plan was rejected by the West. 
But the above were minor events of 1957 when compared 
to the uproar which arose ove~ Syria. There were two 
crises which occurred over that Arab state which made war 
appear imminent in the },fiddle East. 
The first crisis had its beginnings in 1956 just 
about the time of the invasion of Egypt. Syrian Presi-
d.ent Kuwatly, visiting in the Soviet Union, signed a 
communique expressing Soviet-Syrian friendship. But more 
important than such declarations, \vas the fact that during 
November and December of 1956, Soviet arms were reaching 
Syria in ever greater quantity. Since Syria censored any 
news about the arms shipments, the interest of the West 
was sharpened. There ~vere even rumors, which Russia denied, 
of a Soviet military base. 
What happened in Syria was that the army high command, 
in league with several cabinet members, had taken control. 
Several Western observers believed that Soviet influence 
and arms shipments were greater than, in fact, they really 
were. These notions of Soviet control were not eliminatEd. 
f.1 
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by such statements by President Kuwatly as ''the Soviet 
Union will march with us" and ''our army 't?ill stand by 
the side of the Soviet army in defense against aggression, 
'whenever the two armies are required to defend peace and 
freedom in the ·world."7 
But though Syria was not a satellite of the Soviets 
as some thought, it was assuming an important position 
in Soviet policy. There ,v-as a large quantity of Soviet 
arms deposited in the country, and many influential 
groups were pro-Soviet. The illegal Communist Party, 
whose leader, Khaled Bakdash, was a member of Parliament, 
worked unimpaired in the open. The younger officers 
were pro-Soviet because of a belief that Russia was the 
only power to prove its support for the Arabs.a Thi~ 
attitude of many Syrians ,vas, in part, the result of 
suspicion and hostility toward the lvest. There was 
dissatisfaction ~vi th Syria's accomplishments, her poli ti-
cians, and her frequent military dictatorships. Also t 
there was the fact that Syrians are less worldly-wise 
than some of their neighbors.9 
This feeling reached a high point in January 1957, 
when a mass trial of pro-\;Jestern and conservative leaders 
occurred on a charge of attempted overthrow of the Govern-
ment with intent to introduce pro-\,Jestern leadership.lo 
Further alarms were raised by Iraqi machinations to get 
northern Syrian landowners to stage a coup d'etat in 
Iraq's favor. Then there ti1ere bribes being offered by 
.I 
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Saudi Arabia for its own purposes~ All of these things 
had Syria at a fever pitch. 
There was politic al scheming by such men as Khalid 
al-Azm, who sought Sovie_t help in eliminating the 
Ba'thists. There were three main political groups seek-
ing power in Syria: 
nationalist parties. 
I 
the Communists; the Ba'th; and the 
' 
All were seeking some sort of 
union with Egypt, but by various means and for different 
purposes. The nationalists and the Conununists wanted a 
loose federation in which Syria could maintain autonomy 
with Soviet support. The Ba'th wanted outright fusion 
between Syria and Egypt.11 This particular debate lasted 
all through 1957. 
The internal tension within Syria died do¥1Il while 
Soviet influence continued to increase. In March, Syria 
accepted a Czechoslovak offer to build an oil refinery 
but turned down a loan from the World Bank because of 
excessive interest and fear of political pressure. Of 
course, Syria was not afraid of such pressure when she 
aslted tl1e Soviet Union for the loan instead. 
The objective of the Soviet Union was to have Syria 
as an ally, and not a satellite. This goal met with no 
-
objections on the part of the Syrian Government, and 
people, for they felt that there were conunon international 
aims between Syria and Russia. Also, Syria admired Soviet 
socia1- and economic accomplishments. But it was not I 
enough that Syria follow a favorable foreign policy, the 
l 
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Soviet Union also wanted an incternal revolution which 
!l), would form a unity of ideology between Syria and Russia. 
However, what Syria did not realize was that by 
proclaiming its close friendship with the Soviet Union, 
the other Arab states might be frightened away by 
thoughts --of Soviet hegemony. Soviet policy called for a 
gradual increase of influence throughout the entire Arab 
bloc and not the creation of spectacular gains which 
could alienate support in other quarters. But the Syrians 
did not do as they 'tvere supposed to, and felt that they 
could challenge their neighbors and receive Soviet support 
for their actions.12 
Syz~a, by the summer of 1957, was the c~osest to the 
Soviet Union of all the Arab states, and the strongest 
single political group in the country was the Communist 
Party.13 The strength of the Communist Party had grown 
as the result of maneuvers such as this: Khaled Bakd~sh 
/ 
/ made a speech which caused the resignation in prqtest of 
thirty-six People's Party parliamentary deputies in June, 
1957. What incidents such as these show is that the 
opposition was giving up its influence, rather than 
having it snatched away by the Communists.14 
The main crisis over Syria began in July 1957, with 
a trip by Khaled al Azm to Europe. :Many believed that 
he was sent away in disgrace as a measure of appeasement 
to King Saud, whom al Azm had attacked·in a speech. How-
ever, Khaled al Azm wound up in l~scow, with a delegation, 
t' 
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to talk to the Soviet leadership.15 The Syrians were 
in Russia from July 27 to August 7 and returned home by 
way of Czechoslovakia on August 16. The Syrian-Soviet 
connnunique stated that there was agreement on Soviet 
aid in road and railway cronstruction, hydro-electric 
plans, and an increase in trade. Also discussed was 
the enlargement of the Syrian port of Latakia. There 
was no mention of the details in the military agreement 
but the Syrian Ambassador to the Soviet Union said: 11 I 
am now in a position to state that- Syria's military 
requirements wil~ be fulfilled." Fakher Kayyali, a 
member of the Syrian delegation, remarked that half of 
the Syrian budget went toward arms purchases. Finally, 
Khaled al-Azm said: 
' " 
The u.s.s.R. has given us political support and 
supplied us with arlas. Its stand during the Suez 
aggression was honorable, and you 'tvill remember 
•••• how we received reports of Soviet interven-
tion, and how this intervention delivered the 
Arabs from the major catastrophe ivhich imperialism 
wanted to inflict upon them. The u.s.s.R., we believe, will continue along this line.16 
On August 9, the chief of the Syrian army, Tawfiq 
Nizam ad-Din, a moderate, was forced to resign, and was 
replaced by Colonel Afif al Bizri, a Communist sympathizer. 
And several days later, the Syrians demanded the recall 
of four American diplomats who were accused of plotting 
the overthrow of the Government. The response of the 
United States was the declaration that the Syrian Ambass-
ador was persona non grata. 
The reaction of the Soviet Union to this new develop-
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ment was at first subdued. Soviet press editorials 
4 assumed the. attitude that American conspiracies were 
•• 
not unusual and could be expected.17 
More purges followed in Syria when many army and 
police officials were arrested and Foreign Ministry 
members were transferred. It now appeared as though 
the Syrian leadership, although nominally committed to 
union with Egypt, was·letting itself fall under Soviet 
direction.18 
The United States sent Deputy Under-Secretary Loy 
Henderson on a tour of Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey 
to assess the J.vlid-Eastern situation. Upon his return, 
Henderson reported that these countries were concerned 
by Syrian developments and afraid she might become a 
Soviet satellite.19 The United States sent arms to 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq to strengthen these govern-
ments against possible subversion. Syria was warned by 
the United States that if she gave hersel'f over to Soviet 
domination she could fall under the sanctions of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine.20 
The Soviet press reacted to these American steps 
with such statements as "Dangerous lvfoves, '' and "America 
is using blackmail and pressure - this is the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in action, America has learned nothing from 
Bfitp.in's experience." "The U.S. prepares aggression; 
' 
the American aggressive conspiracy should be suppressed 
at once. n21 On September 10, Soviet Foreign Ivlinister 
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Gromyko· accused the United States, Britain, and Turkey 
I 
of a "provocative campaign" against Syria. And the Soviet 
pre.ss warned of Turl<.ish troops being· concentrated along 
the Syrian border. Marshal Bulganin, on September 13,. 
wrote a let·ter to Turkey's Prime :tv1inister lvarning him 
not to attack Syria and threatening Soviet action. A 
Soviet Naval Squadron arrived off Latakia on.September 19 
and was given a hearty welcome. The next day all Syrian 
Army leaves were cancelled; roads between Latakia,Homs, 
and Aleppo were closed, and an emergency meeting of the 
Defense Committee was called.22 The situation seemed 
all the more explosive when the United States' Sixth 
Fleet was reported to be off the Syrian coast and when 
~ TASS reported a "hysterical hullabaloo" in the United 
States.23 The Soviet Union promised Syria total diplo-
matic and military protection in case of attack. 
On September 19 Secretary Dulles told the United 
Nations General Assembly that in Syria "political power 
is being increasingly taken over by those who depend on 
l-1oscow." The reaction of the United States was to send 
more arms to friendly countries in the ~lid-East.24 
Khrushchev, on October 7, said that the United States 
was inciting Turkey to war with Syria but then warned 
that if war did occur, the Soviet Union would not stand 
idly by.25 No doubt the Soviet Union had some cause to 
be worried about Syria. There were the 1'urkish military 
maneuvers along the Syrian border, the NATO exercises in 
·, 
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the Medi t.erranean, the Henderson mission, the American 
warning about the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the increased 
American arms shipments to the Mid-East. Such American 
' . 
displays of force had an effect upon the internal affairs 
of Jordan in April 1957 and they might be effective in 
Sy~ia.26 
The Syrian Government, on October 8, brought accu-
sations against 1'urkey before the United Nations General 
Assembly, and formally protested to the 1urkish Govern-
ment the ~lilitary moves on their frontier. 
On October 11, Khrushchev, bypassing the Western 
Governments, addressed letters to the British Labor Party 
and to the Socialist parties of Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Holland, Italy and Norway, asking them to use their 
influence to halt aggression in the Mid-East, and suggest-
ing party talks with the CPsu.27 
The Soviet newspaper Sovetskaya Rossia said on 
October 12: 
Military planes from Turkey have repeatedly violated 
Syrian territory. 'Iurkish soldiers are attacking 
the peaceful inhabitants who live along the border 
strip 0000 Bullets have already begun to fly oe•• 
Turkey should mobilize he~ good senseo 1he un-
leashing of aggression against Syria, coco would 
mean national suicide for Turkeyo The 1urkish 
people •••o should forestall those representatives 
of the ruling circles of their o,vn country 'tvho, at 
the instigation of American militarists, are acting 
senselessly and irresponsibly. 
The next day an Egyptian batallion landed at Latakia, 
an action made simple by the fact that both Egypt's and 
Syria's forces were under one command. And on October 15, 
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the Egyptians reported the declaration of a state of 
em.erg.ency in Syria. This action would seem to signify 
that matters had calmed down in Syria since the uproar 
in September.28 
On October 15 the Soviet press accused the United 
States of trying to overthrow the Syrian Goventment. 
Pravda said that a group of the "antipopular National 
Social Party working closely with American agents in 
the Near East, ~vere sent into Syria. This group ivas 
instructed to organize a government coup d'etat in 
Syria. ,,29 The next day Andrei Gromyl<.o addressed a letter 
to the United Nations saying·· that the Soviets would help 
''crush • aggression with its military forces.'' He also 
stated that Syria lvould be subject to an attack which 
''is to take place after the Turkish elections on October 
27." He produced a copy of a document said to prove 
that Turkey would attack on October 28 but the United 
States rejected it as a forgery, as did the i\rab dele-
gates to whom it had been shown. But Moscow did not 
withdraw its statements.30 
The Soviet press set out to crush the rumors that 
Syria was a Russian military base. The Soviet Union had 
to eliminate any suggestion which might give the West a 
justification for charges of Soviet control of Syria. 
Concerning reports that a naval base was being constructed 
in Latakia TASS said it was 
authorized to state that this report does not corres-
pond to the facts, and is from beginning to end a 
' . 
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fabrication calculated to justify the hostile 
activity of certain aggressive circles toward 
Syria and Yemen.31 · 
TASS, on October 19, commented upon the Loy Henderson 
mission but failed to be entire accurate in its report-
ing. The news agency stated that Henderson contacted 
"refugees from Syria who had participated in the recently 
discovered conspiracy.rr TASS insisted that Henderson had 
discussed plans for an internal upheaval in Syria aimed 
at supplanting the pro-Soviet leadership, and finished 
with a warning that the Soviet Union "will take all the 
necessary steps to come to the aid of the victims of an 
aggression."32 
A few days later Russia announced that Marshal 
Rokossovski had been appointed to command the Trans-
Caucasus Military District on the Turkish-Pers·ian frontier, 
a hint that the Soviet Union would halt aggression. On 
October 24, there were military and naval maneuvers by 
the Trans-Caucasus army and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. 
The same day Marshal Zhukov stated: 
The Soviet Government has made authoritative and 
appropriate pronouncements that if war is declared, 
the Soviet Union \vill not remain ivith its arms 
folded. We are all ready to strike at any military 
adventure organized by the u.s. near our southern 
borders. \1le resolutely informed the Turkish Govern-
ment of this also. 
About the same time, Egypt announced that Cormnander-in-
Chief General Amer would visit }~scow.33 
But suddenly, all the talk of imminent aggression 
came to an end, and it was rumored that Marshal Zhukov 
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had been dismissed because of his errors in the Syrian 
• • 
).' 
crisis. Onr'· October 29, at ~ Turl<.ish Embassy reception 
in Moscow, Khrushchev appeared in a good mood. Asked if 
his presence was a gesture of peace, Khrushchev said, 
"Yes, this is a gesture toward peace."34 
This new attitude on the part of the Soviet Union 
was probably caused by the fact that Russia was not 
succeeding in scaring the Arabs into joining the Soviet 
camp. The arabs were not happy with Syria's refusal to 
accept King Saud's mediation offer. And many in the 
Afro-Asian bloc were angry with the Soviet Union's con-
stant talk of war. Also, the United States and Britain 
reaffirmed their commitment to Turkey, and Khruschev's 
proposals to the Western Socialist parties were rejected. 
With such set-backs Khrushchev probably thought it best 
to ease the crisis. By November 1, the General Assembly 
debate was finished without a vote taken on the Syrian 
complaint. The Crisis was over.35 
Why did the crisis arise? Khrushchev, in an inter-
view with A.neurin Bevan, explained: 
There are gentlemen from Syria in Istanbul under 
the protection of the Turkish Government who are 
to maneuver themselves into office in Syria. Once 
they are in office, something will happen and if 
it does not happen it will be made to happen •••• 
It 1;vill be pretended that Syrian independence is 
in danger and that then this Syrian Government 
'"'ill invite the Turks to enter.36 
Thus was the official Soviet version. But it must be 
remembered that the United States and Turkey were con-
cerned with Syria's radical pro-Soviet trend and at the 
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same time as they expressed their wo~ry, there were NATO 
maneuvers in the Mediterranean and Turkish military 
exercise. Plus, the United States increased its arms 
shipments to the Mid-East. Given the suspicious mind of 
of the Soviet Union, she could have believed that the 
West would attack Syria. However, it does not seem to 
be that simple. There are several possible reasons for 
the Soviet action during the Syrian crisis. One is that 
the Soviet Union was caught by surprise in a turmoil 
created by Syria and did not quite know how to respond, 
but thought firm action would keep Syria faithful. But 
one must doubt that Russia is so inexperienced that she 
would get caught off-guard and act so drastically over a 
relatively minor explosion. Another explanation is that 
the Soviet Union created the crisis as a means of ousting 
Marshal Zhukov, but to raise such a storm to excuse 
Zhukov's demotion could have lead to drastic international 
complications. This writer is inclined to feel that the 
Soviet Union took advantage of a tense situation created 
by Syria. If the Soviet Union could make it appear as 
though the West was about to attack Syria, then she 
might feel compelled to align herself with the great power 
for self-defense and wind up as a satellite. The other 
Arab states might likewise feel threatened and strengthen 
their ties with the Soviet Union. The end result would be 
a Syria turned satellite from which the other Arab states 
;· .• w 
could be subverted. And since the other Mid-Eastern states 
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would feel threatened by the West, they would oust all 
pro-Western influences and turn East. But the plan did 
not work because instead of praising the Soviet Union as 
protector, the Arab bloc criticized the Soviet Union for 
its warlike talk, and also was angered by the fact that· 
Syria did not accept Arabian mediation. Furthermore, 
the Arabs were frightened by the prospect of a Soviet 
oriented Syria and may have increased their Western ties 
instead of becoming pro-Soviet. For these reasons, 
Khrushchev thought it best to ease the crisis before he 
lost the friendship of the Arabs, and so he appeared at 
the Turkish embassy and made his peace statement. 
Having failed to stampede the Arab bloc into the 
Soviet camp, Russia continued with the trade and aid 
program which had produced favorable results. At the 
end of October Syria and the Soviet Union signed an 
agreement on economic and technical collaboration. The 
agreemen-s, based on 1 'equali ty, noninterference in inter-
nal affairs and respect for the sovereignty and national 
dignity of both countries," called for collaboration "In 
the construction of railroad lines, dams, power stations, 
and water systems for fields and pastures", and "in the 
"1· 
construction and renovation of highway bridges, in build-
ing a plant for nitrogen fertilizer, and in other projects, 
I 
and also in the preparation of a geological map of Syria 
and in conducting geological prospecting •••• " The Soviet 
'11.; 
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Union also agree_d to do all of the designing, prospect-
, ing and research necessary for the above projects, and 
to supply any machinery· or tools for the 'tvork which 
Syri.a lacked. Credit was to be for a twelve year period 
r at 2.5% interest.37 
In November, an Egyptian delegation under General 
Abdul Hakim Amer, the lYlinister of Defense, visited the 
Soviet Union at the latter's invitation. 
During the conversations the Soviet Government in response to the desires of the Egyptian government and President Garn.al Abdel Nasser, 
expressed readiness to offer Egypt economic and 
technical aid in developing its national economy. The Soviet Union's contribution to tl1is matter [was·-·1 sincere, friendly, and based on respect for The national dignity and sovereignty of Egypt.38 
. 
The next month another Egyptian delegation, this 
time of cultural lea<lers, signed an agreement calling 
for a festival of Soviet films to be shown in Egypt, 
with the favor to be returned by the Soviet Union. 
Russia further agreed to send ballet teachers to help 
organize dance studios in Egypt. Also, it was provided 
that there would be an exchange of books and periodicals 
dealing with the history and culture of the two countries.39 
That same month the Soviet Union, "follo~ving with profound 
sympathy the efforts of the Egyptian and Syrian peoples 
to develop their national economies, expressed its readi-
ness to render them economic and technical assistance in 
carrying out their construction plans ••• u40 
During the winter of 1957-1958, Crown Prince Badr of 
/ ( 
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Yemen visited the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, and 
Cormnunist China. In Pelcing he signed a ten-year trade 
and aid agreement and soon Chinese and Soviet technicians 
'tvere building a road between Sana and Hodeida. However, 
Yemen continued to cherish its relations with the West 
and allowed the United States to establish a permanent 
legation in Taizz.41 
Nineteen fifty-eight began with an Afro-Asian con-
ference in Cairo, but most of tl1e representatives ,;,;rhich 
attended were not governmental officials. Nevertheless, 
for Nasser it did represent a boost of his prestige among 
the underdeveloped countries.42 Most of the governments 
invited, save for the Communist ones, declined and so the 
conference was one of those leftist and pro-Soviet affairs 
out of which the Russians usually gather propaganda 
capital. The attempt was made to have the conference con-
sidered as a second Bandung - thus the title, People's 
Bandung. The Soviet delegate, who should not have been 
there if it was a second Bandung, said, "We are ready to 
help you as brother helps brother. Tell us v1hat you need 
and we will help you and send, to the best of our abilities, 
money in theform of loans or aid.'' The neutrals at the 
conference were silenced and the Soviets and Chinese were 
dominant. 
President Nasser, who did not attend the conference, 
allowed a permanent headquarters to be established in 
Cairo. On its secretariat there were one Soviet and one 
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Chinese, and this group became active in Africa. This 
~vas the biggest gain for the Soviet Union to come out 
of the Conference. But in spite of these gains, the 
• 
Sovie.t Union 'tvas not satisfied ~vith Egypt's response to 
Soviet blandishments; she was moving away.43 
This new coolness in the Egyptian attitude was soon 
followed by another set-back for Soviet policy - the 
formation of the United Arab Republic. This was an un-
expected occurrence and was primarily caused by Syrian 
initiative. When !<haled el Azm was in Russia he spoke 
of the "federal union ivi th Egypt which ~ve are going to 
establish soon." Ho'tvever, the process was hastened by 
leaders of the Ba I ath, who °t'lanted a very close Egyptian 
connection, and they persuaded a lukewarm Nasser that 
union would be ·a favorable course 0£ action.44 In the 
negotiations, the Ba'athists had the support of govern-
ment, army, and business groups who feared the pro-Soviet 
trend in Syria.45 
The next Arab state to seek closer ties with Egypt 
was Yemen, which federated with the United Arab Republic 
on March 8, 1958. The title, United Arab States, was 
the designation of the U.A.R. and Yemen, the latter 
keeping its government and identity separate.46 
.. ,. 
Within Syria the repercussions of the union were most 
displeasing to the Soviet Union. The various political 
parties, including the Communist, were subject to the 
restrictions as obtained in Egypt. The Communist party 
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was illegal and its members reeeived the Nasser-type 
treatment. Khaled al-Azam was in disgrace and went into 
exile.47 
The Soviet Union did not like the U.A.R.; Russia had 
always advocated Arab nationalism but not an Arab nation. 
But the Soviets could not criticize the new entity since 
this would cause a loss of grace in Arab eyes.48 What 
could the Soviet Union do? To support Nasser in this 
action would be to hand over to his tender mercies some 
of the most ardent Soviet supporters in the ~liddle East. 
To attack Nasser would be an admission by Khrushchev 
that he had blu.ndered in his policies. Thus, the reaction 
of Russia was friendly, and she was one of the first to 
recognize the U.A.R.49 
, 
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VII An Evaluation 
··- :· ·' 
.. 
The trade and aid program of the Soviet Union of 
necessity must be accompanied by political measures if 
policy objectives are to be reached. In looking at the 
Middle East, we see that Egypt, Syria, and Yemen ~vere 
the recipients of much aid and political support. The 
aid program is impressive considering that fact that it 
was only be.gun in 1953. What makes it more astounding 
,i 
is the fact that the Soviet Gross National Product does -
not make it too attractive for the Soviet Union to divert 
its resources into aid channels.l 
In organizing their aid program, the Soviets "render 
economic and technical assistance first of all to the 
state sector of their economies." This is done in the 
belief that "only by relying on a strong state sector 
can the young countries safeguard their economic indepen-
dence in the struggle against the powerful monopolistic 
associations of the imperialists." The Soviets al,vays 
try to make maximum use of the aid recipient's own 
natural resources, and this policy in turn "contributes 
to the development of initiative in the young states and 
maximum savings of scarce foreign currency and expansion 
of domestic output of all branches of the economy ••• '' 
Another purpose of this policy, the import~hce of ~,1hich 
we shall discuss later, is the "creation of scientific 
and technical cadres" in the underdeveloped count~ies.2 
:r,_J,:~··--------------------------~ 
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It would be a mistake to consider the Soviet aid 
program as consisting of free grants; rather, it is 
capitalist in nature, with the granting of long-term 
loans at.interest. The aid program is really one of 
international lending.3 The Soviet Union's loans were 
more desirable than those of the tt!est because the 
interest rates on the former were 2.5% - 3%, as opposed 
to 4% - 6% for the latter.4 However, the trade agree-
ments do not appear to have such a business-like charac-
ter. Here the Soviet Union accepts payment in commodi-
ties the buyer usually exports, and in repayment of 
loans, this too is the case. From Egypt the Soviets 
usually accept cotton and rice; from Syria, cotton, oil 
seeds, vegetable oil, fruits, vegetables, wool, tobacco, 
skins, hides, hemp, and textiles. This would seem to 
indicate that the Soviet Union many times accepts goods 
it does not need, thus it is really aiding the countries.5 
The Soviet Union is fond of speaking as though only 
the Socialist states offer t•true" aid. 
Trade of the underdeveloped countries with the Western powers is based on the principles of ~ 
ruthless exploitation and plunder, whereas their 
relations with the Soviet Union are founded on the principles of business-like cooperation, 
equality of the sides, and mutual advantage. In this sense i t1~acle °\vi th the Soviet Union and the 
·other Socialist sJcates can be regarded as assist-
ance in winning economic independence by the 
underdeveloped countries.6 
But there are strings attached to the aid, even 
though the Arab leaders would no~ consider them as such. 
The economies, development, finances, and armaments are 
ti . 
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dependent upon Soviet aid and equipment. Thus, to oper-
ate what they have received from the Soviet Union, the 
Arabs need Russian advisers, technician~, training, and 
replacement parts. This gives the Soviet Union a measure 
of control over the recipient states.7 
Also, the Soviet technicians are the teachers of the 
Middle Eastern experts, thus orienting this important 
group toward Soviet technical experience. And when more 
trained personnel are needed, they are sent to Soviet 
schools for training, an important means of spreading 
Russian propaganda.a 
In terms of psychological impact, the Soviet aid 
may be bringing profitable returns. The Soviet emphasis 
upon heavy industry results in projects which are on 
exhibit for all to see and appreciate. Also, Soviet aid 
was not invested in local enterprises, and so escaped 
~ 
some criticism like that directed against Western private 
firms l"7hich were accused of trying to win control of Asian 
industries. The Soviet Union has given the appearan~e of 
not wishing to interfere in the economic life of the 
underdeveloped countries.9 
There are various reasons for the Soviet Union's 
economic offensive. For one, the Soviets would like to 
see the traditional trade between the underdeveloped coun-
tries and the \~est disrupted. This objective is helped 
by the difficulty now experienced by the underdeveloped 
countries in having the value of their raw materials 
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decline ~vhile the Western countries are charging more 
for the products of their industry. But this factor 
has still not lessened the advantages of trade with the 
Western nations, although this situation could still 
change. The Soviet Union would like to keep the West 
from the raw materials upon which it depends, and to 
keep it from selling its finished products to the East.10 
Another objective of. Soviet aid is to lessen Western 
influence in the world, and to obtain world domination by 
demonstrating the superiority of the Soviet way of life 
over all others. Since many underdeveloped countries 
are more interested in economic development than in 
ideology, economic aid would bring more rewards.11 
The Soviet Union has realized the necessity of carry-
ing on the East-West struggle on economic terms. For 
example, it has been observed: 
The changes in the balance of forces in the world 
and the change in the very nature of war, add tre-
mendously to the significance of peaceful co-existence 
among countries ,;vi th different socio-economic systems. The intensive growth and increased might of the Socialist system offers a real possibility for the 
triumph of the principles of peaceful co-existence 
th1""ougl1out the historical period in ,r1hich the two 
socio-economic systems - Capitalism and Socialism-
'tvill e}cist side by side. The threat of a nuclear holocaust has made it a vital necessity for all 
manl<.ind.12 
The same writer believed that such conditions as he 
described allov1ed the Soviet Union to prove the superior-
ity of its system. 
We have seen that there is speculation among Communists 
) 
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as to the role played by the so-called national bourgeoisie. 
The Communists ostensibly believe that the national 
bourgeoisie will begin to remove the influence of foreign 
capital - economic .,imperialism - and supplant it with 
their own • 
••• the absolute increase in the amount of foreign 
capital is accompanied by its relative weakening, 
and a decline of its share in the economyo The 
prospect undoubtedly is one of worsened relations 
between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism 
and, on this basis, broad sections of the bourgeoisie 
could be dravm into the struggle against imperialism.13 
In spite of this potential_role of the national 
bourgeoisie as a progressive force, this group was still 
backward in important areas, and a class conflict would 
develop between these and the workers. 
A national democracy is not a socialist state. Its 
purpose is to c9mplete the general democratic, anti-
imperialist' ancti-feudal revolution. The consistent 
accomplishment of these tasl<.s vlill greatly accelerate 
the progress of the revolution, lead the masses into 
the political arena, expelling the pro-imperialist, 
reactionary elementso A re-grouping of class forces 
is lil<.e\1Jise inevitable: the vJorl<.ing class, peasantry 
and democratic intellectuals will become the ruling 
and leading force in the coalition holding power in 
a national democracy.14 
Thus will end the nation~ bourgeoisie; in a most 
classical Communist manner. There does not seem to be 
any contradiction between this approach and that of tradi-
tional Conununism. As a good Communist one could argue that 
historical periods cannot be skipped and that the bourgeoisie 
does have a progressive role. But in view of the fact that 
.the Soviet Union does not vehemently denounce anti-
Communist activity in some of the underdeveloped countries 
l I 
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one could ask whether th.e R11ssians ideologically 
speal,ing do not give too great an emphasis to the 
.national bougeoisie. 
In applying these considerations ·to the Middle East, 
we can detect several problems. How can the Soviets meet 
the desires and needs of the area while establishing 
close relationship and not creating a third world force? 
What is the maximum limit the aid program can approach 
before the Soviet bloc is subject to a strain on its 
growth potential? So far Russia has solved the second 
question by a careful allotment of tasks to the satellites 
in such a way as not to inhibit and still take advantage 
of the economic potential of each bloc country.15 
Up until about 1953, the Soviet Union directed only 
between 5 - 10% of its trade to the Mid-East, and much 
of this went to Iran and Turkey, her traditional partners, 
and not to the Arab states.16 From 1954 the Soviet Union 
made large increases in its trade with Egypt and Syria. 
In 1954 Egypt imported 5.9% of her total imports from 
the Soviet bloc, and in 1956 and 1957 the import figures 
were 13% and 26% respectively. As for exports to the 
Soviet bloc from Egypt, the figures for the above men-
tioned years were 14.1%, 34%, and 47% respectively. 
Syria's trade figures were not as large as Egypt's, but 
some idea of Soviet success is seen in the fact that in 
the single year between 1956 and 1957,-Syrian imports 
from the Soviet bloc increased three times, and her ex-
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ports, two times.17 
It is estimated that from 1956 to 1958, the Arabs 
received more than a billion dollars in credit from the 
Soviet bloc. Egypt received about $300 - $320 million 
in credit for development, and about $250 million for 
anns; Syria got) $200 - $300 million credit for develop-
/ 
ment and $150 - $250 milli~~redit for arms; Yem.en, 
$75 million development and $20 million credit for arms.18 
To pay for all of this the Egyptians and Syrians 
mortgaged their cotton crops for many years. In 1955 -
1956 the Soviet bloc received 36,800 tons of Syrian 
cotton, two-thirds of which went to Czechoslovakia. By 
1958 Syria was sending 40~ of her exports to the bloc, 
most of which in that year went.to China. In 1955 the 
satellites took about 12.5% of Egypt's cotton exports, 
and the next year the figure was 27 .5%, which involved 
more cotton because of the higher percentage of export 
and increased cotton production. It is estimated that 
in 1955 - 1956 the bloc took about $100 million worth 
which it did not need as a political measure. The next 
) 
year the bloc could not purchase so much cotton because 
its w_arehouses were overloaded, but they did take 54.5% 
of Egypt's exports. Howev~r, the high percentage re-
presented less cotton because Egypt's farmers had had a 
bad year. And during the first eight months of 1958, 
the Soviet.bloc purchased 62.6% of Egyptian exports. 
These figures would seem to indicate that the Soviet 
_., 
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bloc has been a great boon to the Arab economy. It was, 
but there "tvere also drawbacl<.s. For example, the Soviet 
Union paid high prices for the cotton, but this caused 
Egypt's Western customers to buy elsewhere at cheaper 
prices. Egypt re~lized what happened and blamed the 
Soviet Union for the loss.20 
.Another grievance of the Arabs was that the Soviet 
goods they purchased were of low quality, and their 
delivery was too slow. Several times negotiations· be-
tween Egypt and Russia were delayed by Egypt's insistence 
upon guaranteed prices, quality and delivery.21 
Why do the Arabs trade with the Soviet Union in view 
of her political aims and the dissatisfaction of the Arabs 
with Soviet goods? For one thing, there are advantages 
in this trade, such as the Soviet policy of accepting 
the raw materials and goods of the Arab states as payment. 
Then there is the fact that the Arabs still dislike the 
old colonialists, and Soviet propaganda has not let this 
feeling slowly evaporate. Also, the Arabs feel as though 
there are no political strings tied to trade with the 
Soviet Union, and theY--do not believe that they will be 
., 
drawn into the Soviet orbit. The attitude seems to be 
one of doing business with the devil so long as you do 
-
not lose your sou1.21 The Soviet Union, however, has 
been distressed by the fact that at times the Egyptian 
press has not given adequate coverage to the loan nego-
tiations, andthe people of Egypt have been apathetic 
' :, .. ~,.--_-.... -- -
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toward the Soviet's generosity. Since the present leader-
ship of the Arab countries is anti-Communist, the only 
real hope for a strong pro-Soviet trend lies in those 
technicians trained by the Soviet Union. Perhaps the 
younger generation will be more amenable to Jvlarxist ideas, 
but this is only a slim hope.22 The more successful the 
Soviet aid program is at raising the Arab standard of 
livi~g, the less the attraction of Communism. There is 
little the Soviet technicians can do to proselytize in 
Egypt because the government there tries to isolate the 
Soviets from the population. This segregation is the 
result of Nasser's fear that Soviet propaganda might have 
an effect on Egypt's poverty stricken rural areas and 
produce an anti-government attitude. Also, the Arabs 
feel that the Soviets could not offer an acceptable solu-
tion for their rural problems, so the best thing to do 
is keep them from causing harrn.23 
Keeping in mind the dependence of the Arabs on the 
Soviet Union which we have discussed, and their attitude 
toward Soviet technicians, can the Soviet Union force 
political concessions not wanted by the Arabs? Not in 
the present situation, because their economies are not 
that dependent and most lil~ely, the Arabs lvill be careful 
not to become too indebted to the Russians. But even if 
the Arabs did. go in over their heads, it is doubtful 
whether they ,;vould bo"tv to the dictates of the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union need fail only once in a policy 
-112~ 
of dictation to ruin its prestige in the Mid-East.24 
The l'\rabs could turn to the West and be forever lost to 
the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the Soviet p~licy of trade and aid continues. 
It does not seem as though the Soviet Union can make great V 
gains for itself in the Middle ·East, but it has been able 
to keep Western influence to a minimum. Perhaps this is 
all the Soviets can hope for, but they will undoubtedly 
try for more. However, on the whole, Soviet policy has 
been very successful and more so than the Russians should 
have hoped. 
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